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It is traditional in administrative law to distinguish broadly
between rulemaking and adjudication. Most of the federal Admin-
istrative Procedure Act ("APA") is structured around just such a
distinction. In theory the distinction conforms to the two different
tasks involved: the making of law and its application. Plainly, that
theory has a rather tenuous connection with reality. There is no
simple, clear-cut dichotomy between making law and applying it.
Courts make law as much as legislatures do. The difference, of
course, lies in how they do it. According to the classic model, adju-
dication makes law in the course of settling individual cases and
problems as they arise. By contrast to such an ad hoc, case-by-case
process, rulemaking involves a deliberate effort to create general
law independent of any individual controversy, party, or circum-
stance. One might say that adjudication makes law at the margin
of existing law while rulemaking is free to disregard the margin
altogether. Such a statement is somewhat simplistic, for adjudica-
tors may manipulate cases to make them purely vehicles for law-
* We wish to thank Richard Merrill and Ronald Cass for helpful comments.
t T. Munford Boyd Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
ft John C. Stennis Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1976).
The University of Chicago Law Review
making, while rulemakers make rules that are sometimes scarcely
distinguishable from the adjudication of particular disputes.2 Still,
it is useful as a point of departure for considering agency proce-
dures, and particularly for dealing with those problems of rulemak-
ing that have received considerable judicial and scholarly
attention.3
The legal issues involved in agency rulemaking have shifted
noticeably in their focus over the short history of administrative
law. With only modest oversimplification one can identify several
phases in the legal evolution of administrative lawmaking. The
main issue in the first phase was the delegation of lawmaking pow-
ers to agencies. Despite recurrent hints of vitality in the doctrine
that broad delegations of legislative power to agencies are constitu-
tionally circumscribed, this phase of administrative law passed
into history along with the New Deal legislation that occasioned its
brief life.
The second major phase in the evolution of agency lawmaking
followed logically, if somewhat belatedly, from the first. Granted
that agencies could be, and were, given broad lawmaking powers,
to what extent could such powers be implemented through the
rulemaking process and what was the effect of doing so? One might
suppose that such a basic question would have been raised and re-
solved earlier in the history of administrative law than it was in
fact. Perhaps one reason for the delay is that until the 1960s most
federal agencies were reluctant to use rulemaking processes6 and so
See Note, Due Process and Ex Parte Contacts in Informal Rulemaking, 89 YALE L.J.
194, 203 (1979).
3 Much of the recent academic commentary on rulemaking is collected in DeLong, In-
formal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA. L. REv. 257, 260 n.22
(1979). Earlier general treatments of the rulemaking process include Robinson, The Making
of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administra-
tive Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1970); Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking
or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARv. L. REv. 921 (1965).
Pertinent judicial opinion is fully noted in the above sources.
" The hint is typically made to support a statutory construction of agency powers that
avoids the constitutional implications that might be raised by a broader interpretation. See,
e.g., Industrial Union v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844, 2866 (1980); National
Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974).
' See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (upholding Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942). The passing of the delegation doctrine as an issue of practical impor-
tance has not precluded a continued-even rejuvenated-scholarly debate over its merits.
Compare Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 713 (1969) with Wright,
Book Review, 81 YALE L.J. 575 (1972).
' A noteworthy exception was the FCC, which turned to the rulemaking process as a
means of formulating substantive policy as early as the 1940s. See, e.g., Columbia Broad-
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did not provoke any test of their power to do so. In any event it
was not until 1956, in United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.,7
that the Supreme Court expressly confirmed the power of an
agency to employ rulemaking to determine issues of agency policy,
and thereby to foreclose such issues from contest in adjudicatory
hearings.
Curiously, Storer did not end the dispute over this use of
rulemaking but seems only to have stimulated further litigation as
other agencies began to follow the FCC's lead in using rulemaking
extensively. There were unsettled questions regarding which agen-
cies had how much power to employ rulemaking to determine pol-
icy issues. These and other questions were considered by the courts
throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, in the course of which the
lower courts or the Supreme Court affirmed the rulemaking power
of numerous other federal agencies and applied the Storer prece-
dent in different contexts.8
The latest phase in the development of agency rulemaking has
involved more sophisticated issues. Procedural complexities have
come to the forefront, especially those caused by the judicial and
legislative blending of adjudicatory and rulemaking procedures
into so-called hybrid rulemaking. As issues once decided by adjudi-
cation began to be determined in rulemaking, and as the scope of
administrative power itself was expanded (as the result of in-
creases in the numbers of agencies and their authority to act),
stricter requirements of notice, record evidence, findings, and ex-
planations of reasons were imposed.9 Some of the new require-
casting Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942). The unwillingness of other agencies
to follow suit was the subject of extensive criticism in the 1960s. See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, THE
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 145 (1962); McFarland, Landis' Report: The Voice of
One Crying in the Wilderness, 47 VA. L. Rav. 373, 433-36 (1961). This criticism, plus the
Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956),
and FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964), probably influenced the eventual shift toward
greater use of rulemaking. It is also probable that the shift was incidental to a more activist
conception of the regulatory role. In any case, the trend itself is unmistakable, as can be
seen from even a casual survey of the numerous judicial decisions throughout the 1960s and
1970s passing on the question of rulemaking power. See, e.g., cases cited note 8 infra.
* 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
* See, e.g., FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964); National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n
v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); American Airlines,
Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966). Some things appar-
ently are never so settled as to be beyond legal argument. As recently as 1978 the Supreme
Court found it necessary to reject again a challenge to FCC rulemaking power that in sub-
stance was identical to the challenge the Court rejected 22 years earlier in Storer. See FCC
v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 793 (1978).
' See DeLong, supra note 3, at 276-84.
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ments were mandated by Congress. 10 Others resulted from more
vigorous scrutiny by the courts." The Supreme Court's decision in
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc.,12 however, barred the courts from adding new
procedural requirements to those prescribed by Congress.13 Thus,
except in extraordinary circumstances, responsibility for defining
minimum federal rulemaking procedures now supposedly rests on
Congress alone.
Thus the judicial examination and imposition of procedural
requirements may have peaked, but it has raised questions about
the basic character of agency rulemaking and of rulemaking "due
process" that have yet to be answered. Although due process has
always been a concern lurking in the background of rulemaking au-
thority and rulemaking procedure, attention has not been sharply
focused on the issue. This previous lack of concern may be ex-
plained by the existence of other safeguards. Agency rules are not
self-enforcing, 4 preenforcement judicial review is available,15 and
the necessity of enforcing agency rules through adjudication pro-
vides those affected by rulemaking both with notice and with an
opportunity to be heard by an impartial tribunal prior to the im-
position of any sanction.1 6
However, a series of recent decisions in the District of Colum-
bia Circuit has now placed the issue of "rulemaking due process"
in sharp relief. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,17 Action for Chil-
dren's Television v. FCC,18 and United Steelworkers v. Marshall9
examined standards for ex parte contacts with agency
10 See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act,
15 U.S.C. § 57a (1976); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2056-2058 (1976).
11 See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Mobil
Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d
1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
12 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
13 The most notable set of congressional requirements is the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1976).
" See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
15 See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
" See, e.g., National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 709 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, INTRODUCTION TO THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYsTEM 247-50 (1975).
17 567 F.2d 9, 51-59 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
18 564 F.2d 458, 474-75 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
' No. 79-1048, slip op. at 17-45 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1980).
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rulemakers.20 Association of National Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC21
and United Steelworkers considered requirements of impartiality
for agency rulemakers. In all of these cases an underlying assump-
tion is that the rulemaking process is bounded by certain mini-
mum requirements. It must provide fair play, an opportunity for
the facts and arguments to be presented openly to the agency, and
a reasoned decision in light of the record. As in all due process
inquiries, the extremes of permitted and prohibited practices are
relatively easy to classify. The problem lies in drawing intermedi-
ate lines and in articulating guiding principles.
We begin our analysis of this problem with a brief discussion
of the principal decisions in order to provide a basis for subsequent
discussion. The dialogue that follows explores the possible outlines
of "rulemaking due process" in an attempt to develop a deeper un-
derstanding of the policies and principles involved. For the most
part, the dialogue reflects actual debate between the two of us. Our
dialogue is inconclusive because we simply could not agree on how
the problem should be resolved. Indeed, neither of us is entirely
sure he agrees completely with his own argument.
20 Since Home Box Office and Action for Children's Television, the question of ex parte
contacts in rulemaking has been dealt with in several cases with results that are, at best,
confusing. See United Steelworkers v. Marshall, No. 79-1048 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1980) (ex
parte contacts between agency staff and decision maker, and between outside consultant
and agency staff, found not to be improper); Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (ex parte contacts between agency staff and decision maker, although a source of con-
cern to court, found not to be improper); United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime
Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (ex parte contacts in rulemaking for which a "hear-
ing" was prescribed found to be improper). The principal focus for our discussion will be
Home Box Office. For commentary on the case and the issue, see Nathanson, Report to the
Select Committee on Ex Parte Communications in Informal Rulemaking Proceedings, 30
AD. L. REv. 377 (1978); Note, supra note 2. A special aspect of the problem is treated in
Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80
COLUM. L. REv. 943 (1980).
21 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980). Our discussion
focuses mainly on National Advertisers because it presents a clear and fairly representative
context for evaluating the issue. Several other recent decisions have dealt with the same
issue, however. See United Steelworkers v. Marshall, No. 79-1048 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1980)
(hybrid rulemaking to promulgate workplace safety standards not invalidated by Assistant
Secretary of Labor's statements on the merits of the standard); Assure Competitive Transp.,
Inc. v. ICC, 45 Ad. L.2d 1134 (D.D.C. 1979) (general statements by Chairman of the ICC
concerning deregulation of trucking not a basis for disqualifying him from participation in
rulemaking). For a comprehensive treatment of National Advertisers and the problem of
disqualification, see Strauss, Disqualification of Decisional Officials in Rulemaking, 80
COLUM. L. REv. 990 (1980).
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I. THE JUDICIAL DECISIONS
We did at least agree on the essential facts of the cases that
prompted our discussion. We can start with the impartiality prob-
lem raised by the National Advertisers case. In April 1978 the
Federal Trade Commission initiated a rulemaking proceeding to
consider rules restricting television advertising directed to, or seen
by, audiences of which children constituted a significant propor-
tion.22 This proceeding has been dubbed-in the style of Variety
headlines-the "kid-vid" case. The FTC's action was an outgrowth
of staff recommendations prompted by petitions filed a year earlier
by two "public interest" groups.23 Shortly after the Commission
gave notice of the proposed rulemaking, four trade associations of
advertisers and toy manufacturers petitioned for recusal of FTC
Chairman Michael Pertschuk on the ground that he had prejudged
the issues. Their claim rested on several public statements by
Chairman Pertschuk.24 The petition was refused on the basis that
'2 Children's Advertising, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,967 (F.T.C. 1978). The notice of proposed
rulemaking invited comment on:
the advisability and manner of implementation of a rule which would include the fol-
lowing three elements:
(a) Ban all televised advertising for any product which is directed to, or seen by,
audiences composed of a significant proportion of children who are too young to under-
stand the selling purpose of or otherwise comprehend or evaluate the advertising;
(b) Ban televised advertising for sugared food products directed to, or seen by,
audiences composed of a significant proportion of older children, the consumption of
which products poses the most serious dental health risks;
(c) Require televised advertising for sugared food products not included in Para-
graph (b), which is directed to, or seen by, audiences composed of a significant propor-
tion of older children, to be balanced by nutritional and/or health disclosures funded
by advertisers.
Id. at 17,969.
13 627 F.2d at 1155 n.4.
2 The statements are excerpted and analyzed at length in Judge MacKinnon's dissent-
ing opinion, id. at 1189-92. We note here only some of the more extreme examples. First in
time was an interview on morning television's Today Show, in which Chairman Pertschuk
stated his "serious doubt as to whether any television advertising should be directed at a 3
or 4 or 5 year old, apreschooler ... we have never treated children as commercial objects in
our society." Next, in a speech before a conference sponsored by Action for Children's Tele-
vision ("ACT"), the Chairman referred to the "moral myopia of children's television adver-
tising" and to the "exploitation" of children by advertisers who "manipulate children's atti-
tudes." He went on to state that children could not protect themselves from being
victimized, and then asked rhetorically, "why isn't such advertising unfair within the mean-
ing of the Federal Trade Commission Act?" emphasizing the need to protect children
against "ads that threaten to cause imminent harm-harm which ranges from increasing
tooth decay and malnutrition to injecting unconscionable stress into the parent-child rela-
tionship." Following the ACT conference, the Chairman sent copies of his speech to FCC
Chairman Charles Ferris, Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska, and Washington Post columnist
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the Chairman's remarks concerned only the policy issues, not the
parties in particular.2 Judge Gesell of the District Court for the
District of Columbia disagreed, however, and ordered Pertschuk's
disqualification. e His decision relied on the standard laid down in
Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC: 7 whether the
decision maker had prejudged the facts as well as the law in a par-
ticular case.28 He was not persuaded by the argument that a differ-
ent standard should be applied because the National Advertisers
case involved rulemaking, while Cinderella and its predecessors
had involved adjudication.29 Judge Gesell instead found that the
Coleman McCarthy, together with a note reiterating the FTC's intent to take action with
respect to children's television advertising. Finally, he wrote FDA Commissioner Donald
Kennedy stressing his "conviction . . . that one of the evils flowing from the unfairness of
children's advertising is the resulting distortion of children's perception of nutritional
values."
See id. at 1155.
18 Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 460 F. Supp. 996 (D.D.C. 1978). This
was not the only challenge to the fairness of the kid-vid proceedings. In Association of Nat'l
Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 617 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the court held that interlocutory
challenges to special procedural rules created for this proceeding were not ripe for review.
The court did express its distress at the Commission's "unique steps" that gave "the im-
pression that the proceeding itself is window dressing for the benefit of a court passing on a
final trade regulation rule that was in stock long before its tentative models were displayed."
Id. at 618.
27 425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In Cinderella the court ordered disqualification of
FTC Chairman Paul Rand Dixon from an adjudication of a deceptive advertising complaint
against a "career college and finishing schooL" The school was charged with making false
claims that its courses would qualify students for various positions, such as executive and
airline stewardess. While the case was before the full Commission, Chairman Dixon gave a
speech condemning, as deceptive, newspaper ads "that offer college educations in five
weeks" or promise the possibility of "becoming an airline's hostess by attending a charm
school." See id. at 590. The court, in an opinion by Judge Tamm and joined by Judges
MacKinnon and Robb, found the evidence of bias sufficient to compel disqualification.
18 According to the Cinderella court, the test is whether" 'a disinterested observer may
conclude that [the administrator] has in some measure adjudged the facts as well as the law
of a particular case in advance of hearing it."' Id. at 591 (quoting Gilligan, Will & Co. v.
SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959)). The court also stressed
that "an administrative hearing 'must be attended, not only with every element of fairness
but with the very appearance of complete fairness.' "Id. (quoting Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC,
306 F.2d 260, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1962)).
20 To support its test, the Cinderella court relied primarily on three decisions, see 425
F.2d at 591: Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964), remanded on other grounds,
381 U.S. 739 (1965); Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Gilligan, Will
& Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959). In Texaco, the
ground for disqualification was similar to the facts in Cinderella: a speech by FTC Chair-
man Dixon condemning practices, and companies, that were the subject of an FTC adjudi-
catory hearing. Amos Treat involved prior participation of an agency member in the investi-
gative phase of a case. In Gilligan, the petitioners sought disqualification of the entire SEC
on the basis of an agency press release. The press release, issued after commencement of
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special character of FTC rulemaking, which is a legislatively man-
dated hybrid of adjudicatory and rulemaking procedures, justified
use of the Cinderella standard. 0
The court of appeals reversed in a split decision.3 1 Writing for
the majority, Judge Tamm, the author of Cinderella, concluded
that the Cinderella standard of bias was applicable only to adjudi-
cations. That certain additional, adjudicatory-type procedures
were required in FTC rulemaking proceedings did not change their
basic "legislative" character; hence the standards of bias custom-
arily applied to adjudication would be inappropriate.32 In rulemak-
ing, the National Advertisers majority held, an agency member
may be disqualified "only when there has been a clear and convinc-
ing showing that the agency member has an unalterably closed
mind on matters critical to the disposition of the proceeding."3 3 On
the facts, the majority was not convinced that Chairman Pert-
agency proceedings to revoke the license of petitioners for certain illegal acts, indicated that
the petitioners had engaged in the conduct with which they were charged. The court ex-
pressed doubts in dicta about the propriety of the press release, but found that the petition-
ers had waived any objection by not raising it before the Commission. (In an earlier Cinder-
ella case, Cinderella Career & Finishing School v. FTC, 404 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1968), the
court upheld the FTC's practice of issuing pretrial press releases that accurately summa-
rized the facts and clearly stated that these were agency allegations only; the Gilligan dic-
tum is distinguishable because the press release at issue there stated that the law had been
violated.) On disqualification of agency members for bias in adjudication, see 2 K. DAVIs,
ADMINISTRATIE LAW TREATISE §§ 12.01-.06 (1958) [hereinafter cited as DAVIs TREATISE]; K.
DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEvENTIES §§ 12.01-.05 (1976 & Supp. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as DAVIS, LAW OF THE SEVENTIES].
30 460 F. Supp. at 997. Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commis-
sion Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1976), the FTC is expressly authorized to promul-
gate trade regulation rules banning unfair or deceptive practices. This confirms a power
previously based on the judicial interpretation of the original Federal Trade Commission
Act in National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). The Act also imposed a number of procedural requirements in
addition to those mandated by the APA. The most notable are: an informal hearing at
which interested persons are entitled to present views by oral or written submissions, or
both; a right to rebuttal and cross examination on disputed issues of material fact; a more
extensive statement than usual of basis and purpose for each rule, including, inter alia, its
economic impact; and judicial review under the substantial evidence test instead of the arbi-
trary and capricious test.
31 Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980).
" Id. at 1168-70. Judge Leventhal concurred. On the merits of the disqualification is-
sue, he agreed with Judge Tamm about both the distinction between adjudication and
rulemaking and the criteria applicable to the latter. However, he believed that in future
cases judicial review of bias should await review of the merits of final agency action. Id. at
1175-81.
33 Id. at 1170.
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schuk's mind was closed." '
In a vigorous dissent, Judge MacKinnon criticized the major-
ity for not applying the Cinderella prejudgment standard and for
substituting a new standard: in rulemaking, evidence of bias would
not be disqualifying "unless it could surmount a fence that is horse
high, pig tight and bull strong."3 5 Like Judge Gesell, Judge Mac-
Kinnon found any rulemaking-adjudication distinction inapplica-
ble to FTC rulemakings, given their hybrid character. He inti-
mated that even in ordinary rulemaking, the majority's standard
would be too permissive.3 " He specifically challenged Judge
Tamm's assertion that agency rulemakers are equivalent to con-
gressmen and are appropriately judged by a similar standard.3 7 Fi-
nally, Judge MacKinnon would have found even the majority's
standard to be violated by Chairman Pertschuk's conduct.
3 8
As far as we are aware, no other circuit has yet squarely ad-
dressed the question of the appropriate standard of rulemaker im-
partiality. Even in the District of Columbia Circuit the issue can-
not be regarded as settled. In United Steelworkers v. Marshall,3 9 a
panel of Judges Wright, Robinson, and MacKinnon (the latter dis-
senting on other issues) was noncommittal on whether the Cinder-
34 Id. at 1174. Judge Leventhal went so far as to suggest that Pertschuk's statements
might not have been disqualifying even under the test applied to judges. Id. at 1177.
:5 Id. at 1188.
1 Id. at 1194-96.
37 Id. at 1192-94. Judge Tamm had relied on the following statement by one of us:
Although members of agencies such as the FCC certainly do perform significant judi-
cial functions in deciding individual cases, they perform even more tasks of a legislative
or an executive character.... Why then should the decisionmakers be stamped from
a judicial cast? Insofar as the agency is delegated broad legislative powers and respon-
sibilities, would it not be at least as appropriate to measure agency members against
standards used to evaluate legislators?
Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs,
64 VA. L. REv. 169, 185-86 (1978), quoted in 627 F.2d at 1168. Judge MacKinnon character-
ized these views as "unprecedented" and objected that FTC commissioners could not be
converted into the equivalent of congressmen by judicial decree, let alone academic opinion.
Id. at 1192-94.
627 F.2d at 1197-98. After being vindicated by the court, Chairman Pertschuk re-
cused himself from further participation in the proceeding so that the substantive issues
involved in the proposed rulemaking could be decided without regard to the propriety of his
participation. 946 ANTRUST & TRn REG. REP. (BNA) A-2 (Jan. 10, 1980). Subsequently,
the FTC's rulemaking proceedings on children's television advertising were interrupted by
congressional action that, among other things, eliminated the Commission's authority under
the unfairness doctrine and limited FTC action in this instance to deceptive acts. Federal
Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374; see H.R.
REP. No. 917, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1980).
3' No. 79-1048 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1980).
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ella or National Advertisers standard should govern. The case in-
volved a speech by an Assistant Secretary of Labor on the merits
of an OSHA safety standard then pending in rulemaking. Because
the speech was made after she gave her recommended decision to
the Secretary of Labor, it was considered insufficient proof of bias
even under the Cinderella standard.4 0 Thus the court was not
forced to choose between the standards.
The problem of ex parte contacts in rulemaking also has come
to the fore in recent years. As with bias, the relevant standards for
ex parte activities in adjudicatory cases have been fairly well estab-
lished,41 but the traditional learning has been that those standards
are inapplicable to notice-and-comment rulemaking, and that ex
parte contacts are a proper element of the informal character of
information gathering and opinion shaping in rulemaking.42 Unless
rules are required to be made on the record, 43 the use of ex-
40 Id., slip op. at 22-23.
41 Until a series of episodes in the late 1950s, ex parte communication between agency
decision makers and parties to agency proceedings was not a significant issue. Indeed, the
first edition of Professor Davis's treatise contained no discussion of the issue prior to his
1970 supplement. See DAvis TREATISE, supra note 29, § 13.12 (Supp. 1970). Several episodes
in the late 1950s focused attention on the problem. See, e.g., WKAT, Inc. v. FCC, 258 F.2d
418 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (per curiam). In response, major federal regulatory agencies adopted
specific regulations to restrict ex parte communications in cases conducted "on the record."
See SELECTED REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc.
No. 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 193-205 (1963); Peck, Regulation and Control of Ex Parte
Communications with Administrative Agencies, 76 HARV. L. REv. 233 (1962). Congress con-
sidered proscribing ex parte contacts at that time. Id. at 234. Fifteen years later, Congress
enacted certain restrictions in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 4, 90 Stat. 1246
(1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1976)). These statutory restrictions essentially incor-
porate the rules that the major agencies adopted in the 1960s. Like those xules, the statute
proscribes ex parte contacts only in on-the-record proceedings.
Although the rules proscribing ex parte contacts in adjudication are relatively straight-
forward, some ambiguities can arise in application. For example, the APA does not ban all
ex parte communications but only those that are "relevant to the merits of the proceeding."
5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1)(A) (1976). This language has been interpreted as permitting ex parte
communications on matters of general regulatory policy that only tangentially affect re-
stricted proceedings, except where there is an intent by the party to influence the official in
the disposition of the restricted case. See WHDH, Inc., 29 F.C.C. 205 (1960); Peck, supra, at
247-50. Obviously, this can cause some problems in distinguishing between permissible and
impermissible communications. See, e.g., Multivision Northwest, Inc., 10 RAn. REG. 2D (P &
F) 641 (F.T.C. 1967) (communications on general policy issues that affected pending adjudi-
catory cases). To date, such line drawing does not appear to have presented a large problem.
It remains to be seen whether the extension of the proscription on ex parte contacts to
rulemaking will change this. See note 174 infra.
42 See, e.g., Ex Parte Communications During Informal Rulemaking Proceedings, 68
F.C.C.2d 804 (1978); Nathanson, supra note 20, at 380.
4. See, e.g., DeLong, supra note 3, at 271-72; Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Ad-
ministrator: Hearing Variations and Standards of Judicial Review Under the Administra-
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trarecord information did not appear to present a due process or
other concern until recently, any more than it would in the case of
the legislative enactments that agency rulemaking supposedly
resembles.
The only reported decision banning ex parte contacts in
rulemaking before 1977 was Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v.
United States.44 The Federal Communications Commission had
promulgated a rule reallocating a VHF television channel from
Springfield, Illinois, to St. Louis, Missouri, and subsequently re-
allocating two UHF channels from St. Louis to Springfield.45 Si-
multaneously, the FCC changed the license of a station operating
on one of the UHF channels in St. Louis, in order to permit the
station to operate on the reallocated VHF frequency. The realloca-
tion was actively supported by the St. Louis licensee, which would
have benefited greatly from operating on a technically superior fre-
quency. By the same token, the change was strongly opposed by an
applicant hoping to operate on the superior VHF channel in
Springfield. On appeal, it was discovered that both the St. Louis
licensee and the Springfield applicant had made numerous ex
parte contacts with individual FCC commissioners after the period
for written public comment was closed. 46 Holding these ex parte
contacts improper, the court rejected the Commission's argument
that such contacts were permissible in rulemaking: "[W]hatever
the proceeding may be called it involved not only allocation of TV
channels among communities but also resolution of conflicting pri-
vate claims to a valuable privilege, and. . . basic fairness requires
such a proceeding to be carried on in the open."'
tive Procedure Act and Other Federal Statutes, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 754-55 (1975).
" 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
4' The case was one in a series of so-called "deintermixture" cases in which the FCC
sought to improve the economic status of UHF stations by allocating only UHF stations to
particular markets, thereby eliminating the problem of competition from VHF stations,
which had inherent technical advantages. For a brief discussion, see Robinson, supra note 3,
at 532-35.
" 269 F.2d at 223-24. In addition, the St. Louis licensee wrote each commissioner a
letter containing factual statements possibly material to the outcome, took each commis-
sioner to lunch, and distributed turkeys to each. Id.
"7 Id. at 224. The court distinguished Van Curler Broadcasting Corp. v. United States,
236 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 935 (1956), an earlier allocation
case in which ex parte contacts had been found proper, on the ground that Van Curler
involved a "general nation-wide rule-making proceeding ... [and] did not vitiate an assign-
ment of a particular channel." 269 F.2d at 224 n.6. In an alternative holding, the court
found the ex parte contacts to be violations of the agency's own rules inasmuch as they
occurred after the time for public comment had expired. Id. at 225.
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This apparently sweeping principle proved to be of limited sig-
nificance. It found virtually no further judicial application for eigh-
teen years, even though informal rulemaking increased substan-
tially without any noticeable curbs on ex parte contacts.48 But in
1977, in Home Box Office, the District of Columbia Circuit sud-
denly announced a general ban on ex parte contacts in all rulemak-
ing proceedings. 49 The case involved revision of FCC rules restrict-
ing pay exhibition of programs on cable systems and broadcast
stations. The rulemaking proceeding followed the general form
prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act,50 with public no-
tice and opportunity to file written comments. During the proceed-
ing, the FCC imposed no restrictions on informal, ex parte contacts
between commissioners, staff, regulated parties, and other public
groups. Such contacts occurred throughout the proceeding, includ-
ing extensive lobbying-primarily by cable and broadcast repre-
sentatives-after formal oral argument had taken place and the
record for public discussion had been closed.5 1
On appeal from the Commission's order adopting the revised
48 In Courtaulds (Ala.) Inc. v. Dixon, 294 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1961), appellant relied on
Sangamon Valley in challenging an FTC rulemaking proceeding in which ex parte commu-
nications were made by appellant's competitors. The court held Sangamon Valley inappli-
cable because there was no showing that competitors were specially advantaged by its rule;
the court went on to suggest that Sangamon Valley was strictly limited to cases of quasi-
judicial character. Id. at 904 n.16. In Jarrott v. Scrivener, 225 F. Supp. 827, 835 (D.D.C.
1964), Sangamon Valley was cited in support of a decision invalidating action by zoning
authorities on the ground that ex parte contacts deprived appellants, who had challenged
the zoning board's actions, of a fair hearing. It does not appear that the "hearing" to which
appellants were entitled was a full, trial-type hearing, but the court did not address the
adjudication-rulemaking distinction and treated Sangamon Valley as indistinguishable from
other ex parte cases involving adjudicatory hearings. Ruppert v. Washington, 366 F. Supp.
686 (D.D.C. 1973), also involved ex parte contacts in a zoning action. Here, in contrast to
Jarrott, the court recognized the essentially rulemaking character of the action. Sangamon
Valley was cited but not applied because the contacts were not found to be improper. Id. at
690.
The FCC itself has had surprisingly little occasion to apply Sangamon Valley. Follow-
ing that decision it altered its rules to recognize the principle for a certain class of rulemak-
ing situations, but these rules were extremely limited in application. See Clear Channel
Broadcasting, 18 F.C.C.2d 892 (1969), announcing application of rules to a rulemaking situa-
tion essentially identical to the situation in Sangamon Valley: a frequency allocation involv-
ing a conflict between two parties. Recently redrafted, the current FCC rules continue to
ban ex parte contacts only in Sangamon Valley-type rulemaking. The rules require a public
record to be made of ex parte communications in all cases, however. Ex Parte Presentations,
47 RAD. REG. 2D (P & F) 1213 (F.C.C. June 30, 1980).
49 Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 829 (1977).
5- 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
" See 567 F.2d at 52-54.
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rules, a public interest group argued that the ex parte communica-
tions were improper, at least insofar as they occurred after the pe-
riod for public comment supposedly had expired. 2 The court
agreed, but was not content simply to rule that the agency was
required to adhere to the spirit of the "public comment" period.
Instead, it seized the occasion as an opportunity to fashion a radi-
cal departure from prior understanding. The court announced a
general rule, applicable to all informal agency rulemaking, and in-
validated not only ex parte communications occurring after oral ar-
gument, but also all such communications after issuance of the
public notice of proposed rulemaking.53
Before the Home Box Office principle could be digested, the
same court was asked to apply it to invalidate an FCC policy state-
ment issued before the Home Box Office opinion. In Action for
Children's Television ("ACT"), the court chose to follow a nar-
rower path, and held that the ban on ex parte contacts should not
be applied retroactively." Moreover, dictum in the opinion repudi-
ated the Home Box Office majority's ban on ex parte contacts in all
rulemaking.55 Instead, Judge Tamm's opinion for the unanimous
panel endorsed the view expressed by Judge MacKinnon in his
concurring opinion in Home Box Office.56 That is, the ban on ex
parte contacts should be limited to the presumably small class of
52 Id. at 53.
53 Id. at 57. Although the decision purports to be the joint creation of the panel (com-
posed of Chief Judge Wright, Judge MacKinnon, and District Judge Weigel (sitting by des-
ignation)), the opinion appears to be the product of Chief Judge Wright. At least it does not
fully reflect the views of Judge MacKinnon, who filed a concurring opinion disagreeing with
the portion of the per curiam opinion that banned ex parte communications in all rulemak-
ing. He would have held ex parte contacts in informal rulemaking unlawful only when the
rulemaking involves "competing private claims to a valuable privilege or selective treatment
of competing businesses." In short, he would adhere to the principle of Sangamon Valley.
Id. at 63-64. The court implicitly admitted that its holding was new law. See id. at 54. In
consequence, it was forced to seek support from such eclectic authority as Sangamon Valley
(which applied only to ex parte contacts after the period for public contacts, and had been
quiescent for 18 years); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)
(which required judicial review to be based on the full administrative record before the
agency at the time of the decision); the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1976) (which
banned ex parte contacts only in rulemaking required to be on the record); and Exec. Order
No. 11,920, 3 C.F.R. 121 (1976 Compilation) (banning ex parte contacts with the White
House by those seeking to influence presidential decisions on international air routes).
These authorities provide tenuous support at best for such a sweeping rule.
" Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
55 Id. at 477.
11 Id. at 474. This approach is not surprising, given that Judge MacKinnon himself was
a member of the ACT panel.
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cases to which the Sangamon Valley principle would apply. 7
The law on this subject was not clarified by the recent decision
of the same court in the United Steelworkers case. 58 In addition to
the bias claim raised in that case, the rulemaking was allegedly in-
valid because of ex parte contacts with the decision maker. Two
separate types of contact were challenged. The first involved con-
tact between a key staff attorney, who participated actively in the
rulemaking, and the Assistant Secretary of Labor who was respon-
sible for making an initial decision on the rule-final authority
resting with the Secretary of Labor. Chief Judge Wright, speaking
for the court, held that these contacts were not improper. Home
Box Office was distinguished as involving outside parties with a
financial interest in the rule.5 9 It appears that the emphasis must
be placed on the words "financial interest" rather than "outside
parties," however, for the court went on to approve other ex parte
contacts by outside consultants who, after participating in the
rulemaking hearing, were hired to help evaluate the hearing record.
Chief Judge Wright reasoned that outside consultants operate as
the "functional equivalent of agency staff" and hence are not
within the Home Box Office rule.60 Because of these distinctions,
the court found it unnecessary to resolve the scope of the ex parte
contacts doctrine-specifically, whether to ban contacts between
outside parties and decision makers in all rulemaking cases or only
in those involving conflicting private claims to a valuable
privilege.6
In the face of such confusing precedent, no one can confi-
dently state what the law is on this question. The cases indicate
that the District of Columbia Circuit itself is still undecided.2 The
Supreme Court's decision in Vermont Yankee, invalidating judicial
57 Id. at 474, 477.
" United Steelworkers v. Marshall, No. 79-1048 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1980).
59 Id., slip op. at 32-33. In Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 123-28 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
the court (in an opinion by Judge Tamm, joined by Judges Bazelon and Robinson) allowed
intraagency ex parte contacts even in a case of formal rulemaking on a record. The court
relied on the nonretroactivity holding of ACT and a special provision in the relevant statu-
tory scheme that justified contacts in this case. The court did express "uneasiness," how-
ever, about contacts between staff advocates and decision makers. Id. at 127. Cf. Katherine
Gibbs School (Inc.) v. FTC, 612 F.2d 658, 670 (2d Cir. 1979) (summarily rejecting a chal-
lenge to an FTC rule based on ex parte communications between the commissioners and an
"allegedly biased staff").
6o United Steel Workers, slip op. at 40.
61 Id.
62 See also Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1169 n.40 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (noting the confusion in the D.C. Circuit).
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imposition of special procedures on agency rulemaking, compounds
the uncertainty,63 especially inasmuch as the decision itself has an
unclear future.6
II. THE BIAS PROBLEM
Publius
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the appellate court's
ruling in National Advertisers-that FTC Chairman Pertschuk
had not prejudged the kid-vid issue-is that it is a case of first
impressiQn. The basic principle of impartiality has an ancient line-
age; over three hundred years ago Lord Coke announced it as a
settled principle of the common law and of natural justice that a
person should not be a judge of his own cause." Adherence to the
same principle, expanded into a blanket requirement of impartial-
ity, has been regarded as essential to due process in adjudication.
As Justice Black put it:
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias
in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeav-
ored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. To this end
no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permit-
ted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome ...
[This] rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no
actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the
scales of justice equally between contending parties. But to
63 Interestingly, however, there is no suggestion in any of the decisions that the ex parte
question is affected by Vermont Yankee. In United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime
Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519, 541-42 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the court, in an opinion by Chief Judge
Wright (joined by Judges McGowan and Robinson), relied heavily on Home Box Office and
Sangamon Valley to invalidate an FMC proceeding, which the court described as "quasi
adjudicatory" although it was not subject to the full hearing procedures of the APA, because
of ex parte contacts. In holding the contacts to be inconsistent with the FMC's obligation to
adjudicate the issues in a hearing, the court found its decision to be consistent with Ver-
mont Yankee. Id. at 542 n.63. Dean Verkuil has suggested that U.S. Lines might survive
Vermont Yankee, even though Home Box Office might not; the distinction he draws is that
U.S. Lines involved a special case of informal adjudication for which the APA prescribes no
procedures by contrast to informal rulemaking for which the APA does specify procedures.
Verkuil, supra note 20, at 978. There is as yet no judicial indication that Home Box Office
itself is viewed as an encroachment on Vermont Yankee, however.
6 Compare Scalia, Vermont Yankee: the APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme
Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REv. 345 with Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Admin-
istrative Procedure, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1805 (1978).
61 Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. l13b, l18a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (C.P. 1610).
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perform its high function in the best way "justice must satisfy
the appearance of justice. '66
Inasmuch as federal agencies have used rulemaking for over a gen-
eration (since the 1940s in the case of the FCC, for example),6 7
there has been ample opportunity to consider whether impartiality
should be required in rulemaking. The absence of any mention of
such a principle in a judicial opinion until National Advertisers
suggests to me that the courts have made an implicit judgment
that impartiality of rulemakers is not a due process requirement.
Brutus
The absence of judicial discussion of administrative bias in
rulemaking may simply be attributable to an absence of cases
presenting the issue, and I wonder whether it is so remarkable that
there were no earlier challenges. Rulemaking itself is relatively
modern; more importantly, so is judicial activism in scrutinizing it.
Furthermore, attention until now has been concentrated on the cir-
cumstances in which rulemaking could be used and on the proce-
dures required.
The real mystery is not that the issue of bias in rulemaking
has not arisen previously, but that the court refused to apply Lord
Coke's principle when it did arise. Judge Tamm professed to hold
open the possibility of disqualifying administrative rulemakers
shown to have an "unalterably closed mind,"6 but such a test, as a
practical matter, virtually rules out disqualification for bias in
rulemaking proceedings. The standard would permit disqualifica-
tion only in truly egregious cases. In addition, the requirement that
the bias be demonstrated by "clear and convincing evidence" 69
makes disqualification even less likely. Few, if any, agency admin-
istrators will be so careless as to provide evidence of obvious, egre-
gious bias in their statements at public meetings or in written
materials. Despite minimal inroads into agency "privacy" by the
Freedom of Information Act,70 the court's requirements are an
" In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (quoting Offut v. United States, 348 U.S.
11, 14 (1954)).
67 See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
" Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
69 Id.
7o 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). The Act allows access to statements adopted by an agency and
to staff instructions, but not to the sort of informal or interoffice documents that would be
helpful in establishing an individual administrator's bias. As a result, it would be virtually
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overwhelming burden on anyone challenging an agency decision
maker's impartiality. That is obvious given that neither cross-ex-
amination nor any other direct probing of an administrator's views
is permitted.7 1
The crushing weight of this burden seems particularly clear on
the facts of National Advertisers. Although I am inclined to agree
with Judge MacKinnon that Chairman Pertschuk's speech to ACT
and his television interview by themselves demonstrated disquali-
fying bias under the Cinderella standard,7 2 there is room for de-
bate on that score. In such cases, it is often difficult to distinguish
between the "crystallized point of view," which Professor Davis
rightly tells us should not be disqualifying in adjudication"7 (nor, I
concede, in rulemaking), and a particularized bias about the par-
ties or the issues in a pending case, which is disqualifying. But
when you add to these arguably innocuous public comments Pert-
schuk's letters to two other agency directors, a United States Sena-
tor, and a journalist, all obviously intended to marshal support for
the FTC's actions against television advertising aimed at chil-
dren, 4 I think you have unmistakable proof of a closed mind and
legal bias. You have not only partisan opinion but partisan advo-
cacy.7 15 That defeats the whole purpose of having public comment
and argument in rulemaking. The object of that process is to pro-
vide interested parties with an opportunity to persuade rulemakers
on a particular position. But what kind of opportunity do you have
to persuade one who is committed to advocating an opposing posi-
tion? If, as the court in National Advertisers held, this is not suffi-
cient ground for disqualification, it is difficult to identify any real-
istic situations that would be.
useless to such an inquiry.
71 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971); United
States v. Morgan (Morgan IV), 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
627 F.2d at 1197-98.
2 DAVIS TREATISE, supra note 29, § 12.01, at 131.
7' See note 24 supra.
" For a decision reaching the same conclusion on similar facts, see Berkshire Employ-
ees Ass'n v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 235 (3d Cir. 1941). An NLRB member attempted to aid the
cause of a union in a strike by writing to a large customer of the employer and in effect
requesting the customer to use its influence to persuade the employer to meet the union's
demands. In holding such blatant advocacy to be grounds for disqualifying the Board mem-
ber from participating in a subsequent adjudication concerning the controversy, the court
found this more serious than "ill-advised extra-judicial statements" (which, it implied,
would not necessarily be disqualifying). Id. at 239.
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Publius
True, Judge Tamm's standard for disqualification will be diffi-
cult to meet in cases where disqualification is sought solely on the
basis of the individual administrator's expressed views. But it
should be. What is the alternative? Surely you do not want to im-
peach decision makers merely for possessing a "vagrant opinion
without visible means of support"-to borrow Ambrose Bierce's
definition of "prejudice. '7 8 Judge MacKinnon complains about the
majority erecting a barrier to disqualification that is "horse high,
pig tight and bull strong." Well, that barrier works two ways. If we
disqualify an administrator for possession of any opinion on issues
relevant to a rulemaking, administrators will soon learn to keep
those opinions to themselves. Do you want to keep this "bull" in or
let it out? Judge Tamm has a preference for letting it out. So do I.
That way, interested parties are at least aware of which opinions
they must persuade an administrator to change.
Importantly, Judge Tamm's standard would appear to require
disqualification for egregious forms of bias. I assume that if it
could be shown that a decision maker had a pecuniary stake in the
outcome, or that he had a personal animosity toward individual
parties based on something other than a moral conviction that
they were doing bad things, he would be disqualified even in
rulemaking." This is important: the majority is not saying that
anything goes; at most it is saying that professional prejudgment,
as distinct from pecuniary or personal interest, does not require
disqualification. I do not find that so terrible. Disqualification for
bias has traditionally been very unusual for both agency officials
71 A. BIERCE, THE DEvL'S DIcTIONARY 264 (1911).
71 Disqualification would appear to be required in the case of pecuniary interest by 18
U.S.C. § 208 (1976), which prohibits government employees from participating "in a particu-
lar matter in which, to his knowledge, he, his spouse, minor child, partner, organization...
or any person or organization with whom he is negotiating or has any arrangement concern-
ing prospective employment, has a financial interest." By its terms, this provision covers far
more than cases of adjudication, and there is no reason to construe it as inapplicable to
rulemaking. On the other hand, there is at least one good reason besides the generality of
the language to construe the section as covering rulemaking. Congress and most other legis-
latures, which (as the National Advertisers majority pointed out, see text and note at note
37 supra) perform a function similar to rulemaking, have imposed similar, albeit weaker,
conflict-of-interest rules on themselves. SENATE RuLE XLV, SENATE MANUAL, S. Doc. No. 1,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 96-101 (1977); H.R. RULE XLIII, H.R. Doc. No. 403, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 631-35 (1979). For a review of state rules, see Note, Conflicts of Interest of State
Legislators, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1209 (1963). It seems unlikely that the legislators would re-
strict themselves in this area but leave their delegees, the administrative officials,
untrammeled.
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and judges.78 Despite the rigorous rhetoric employed in judicial
statements of the principle of impartiality, the actual occasions
when the principle is applied to disqualify an adjudicator appear
to be few indeed. Cinderella is exceptional in this regard. 9 I do
not want to argue the merits of Cinderella as applied to adjudica-
tion, however. For now I only question the wisdom or necessity of
extending its holding to rulemaking.
Brutus
What we have in Pertschuk's case is a lot more than an ex-
pression of "vagrant opinion," and that is the cause of my concern.
There is a significant difference between knowledge or information
leading to a preliminary opinion on a policy issue and belief in a
cause. I thus agree with the court in Skelly Oil Co. v. FTC80 that
no basis for disqualification in adjudication (or, I would add, in
rulemaking) "arises from the fact or assumption that a member of
an administrative agency enters a proceeding with advance views
on important economic matters in issue" 81-even if the belief in
question is a "vagrant opinion without visible means of support."
What I am suggesting, however, is that different standards be ap-
plied to dispassionate belief on the one hand and ardent advocacy
" In the early English common law, disqualification of judges was confined to cases
involving pecuniary interest. See Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609-
12 (1947). By the late 19th century, however, the English courts had expanded their stan-
dards to embrace bias on other than pecuniary interest. See Note, Disqualification of a
Judge on the Ground of Bias, 41 HARv. L. REV. 78, 79 (1927). American courts were slow to
follow suit. As late as 1941, it was reported that the prevailing American common law prac-
tice refused to recognize bias as sufficient grounds for disqualification of judges or agency
officials. Note, The Disqualification of Administrative Officials, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 1384,
1384-91 (1941). Today, however, both agency officials acting in an adjudicative capacity and
federal judges are subject to disqualification for bias, under essentially similar standards.
See generally Mitchell v. Sirica, 502 F.2d 375, 382-83 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (MacKinnon, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 955 (1974). The federal statutory standard for judges, 28
U.S.C. §§ 144, 455 (1976), was amended by Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, § 1, 88
Stat. 1609, to broaden and clarify the standards for disqualification. See Comment, Disqual-
ification of Federal Judges for Bias or Prejudice, 46 U. CH. L. REV. 236, 242 (1978).
79 One searches in vain for more than a handful of federal cases disqualifying agency
adjudicators for bias. See generally 2 DAvis TREATISE, supra note 29, §§ 12.01-.06; DAVIS,
LAW OF THE SEVENTIES, supra note 29, §§ 12.01-.05 (1976 & Supp. 1980). Disqualification of
judges appears to be equally or even more exceptional. See United States v. Haldeman, 559
F.2d 31, 129-39 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977);
Mitchell v. Sirica, 502 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 955
(1974).
80 375 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1967), modified on other grounds, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
81 Id. at 18.
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on the other. To be sure, the apparent difference between belief
and advocacy may sometimes be more a matter of the style in
which an opinion is expressed than commitment to that opinion.8 2
But it may also be more than that. I admit the distinction may be
difficult to draw in particular cases, but it can be made. s
In any case, I would not make too much of the distinction be-
tween personal or pecuniary interest and your concept of profes-
sional bias. After all, the underlying concern is the same, whether
the bias is derived from personal interest or professional judgment.
We want to ensure that administrators make decisions based on
the information presented to them rather than on their own biases.
Suppose that one of the following hypothetical factors lies be-
hind the allegations of bias: Pertschuk's wife is president of an or-
ganization seeking the ban on children's advertising; Pertschuk in-
tends to run for Congress and several citizen groups seeking the
ban have pledged critical support for his campaign; Pertschuk's
young daughter became seriously ill from swallowing the contents
of a bottle of flavored aspirin advertised on television programs
that she customarily viewed; or as chief counsel to the Senate
8- Indeed, this possibility may explain the current public problems besetting the FTC
and its Chairman. See Gellhorn, The Wages of Zealotry: The FTC Under Siege, REGULA-
TION, Jan.-Feb. 1980, at 33, 39.
83 Professor Davis has expressed the distinction in the adjudicative context as follows:
[T]he ideal commissioners will be men whose sincere ideas of policy conform to the
broad legislative intent. A Price Administrator ought not to be indifferent to the forces
of inflation, a Trade Commissioner should not be neutral on anti-monopoly policies.
... Administrators who are unsympathetic toward the legislative program are very
likely to thwart the democratic will; the way to translate legislative policies into action
is to secure administrators whose honest opinions-biases-are favorable to those
policies ...
This is far from saying that the law should be administered by zealots or crusaders
who lack perspective or stability. Judgment must of course be guided by intellectual
perception, not by emotion .... Sincere conviction should not be so steadfast as to
shut out inquiry and re-examination. Belief must not be so unyielding as to smother
the contributions that alert practical administration may make to the molding and
remolding of policy. And yet a dominant point of view or bias may appropriately color
all activities, including even the fact-finding function. Thoroughly conscientious men of
strong conviction may sometimes interpret evidence to make findings which indifferent
men would not make. The theoretically ideal administrator is one whose broad point of
view is in general agreement with the policies he administers but who maintains suffi-
cient balance to perceive and to avoid the degree of zeal which substantially impairs
fairmindedness.
2 DAvis TREATISE, supra note 29, § 12.01, at 137-38 (footnotes omitted). This is even more
true in rulemaking, where the administrator is attempting to create a generally applicable
legal framework to carry out the legislative intent, rather than to determine that intent in a
particular case.
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Commerce Committee before his appointment to the FTC, Pert-
schuk was involved in an investigation of the issue and was pub-
licly critical of the FTC for failure to take "immediate, strong ac-
tion against unfair and immoral children's advertising." The first
three cases would presumably involve personal interest, while the
fourth would illustrate professional bias.
But is there any fundamental difference among these situa-
tions? The only relevant distinction I can see is that the situations
may carry different weight as evidence of prejudgment. We may
regard the first three cases as stronger indications of a closed mind
than the fourth. But the distinction goes not to the underlying rea-
son for disqualification, that is, bias; it goes only to the likelihood
that bias exists to a degree that requires disqualification. Of
course, many other types of evidence, such as the public state-
ments Pertschuk actually made, are also relevant to this question.
Once we are satisfied that the totality of the evidence reveals an
inability to form an impartial judgment, why do we care whether
the bias stems from family relationship, personal interest, personal
experience, or professional activities? It is not the source of bias
but rather the fact of bias-that is, an excessive degree of actual or
probable commitment to an opinion-with which we are con-
cerned. It is essentially irrelevant whether, for example, Pert-
schuk's mind is closed because he suffered trauma while watching
"Captain Caveman" on Saturday morning television or because he
has a personal relationship with one of the protagonists.
Publius
The particular cause of bias may not be important, but it is
appropriate to distinguish between a judgment that is based on
factors that would be irrelevant or improper to present in the pro-
ceeding itself, and those based on considerations that are relevant
and proper but happen to come to the administrator's attention
outside of the proceeding.
Consider, for example, the first two hypotheticals. Both raise
at least a suspicion that Pertschuk's judgment will be influenced
by considerations that would not be proper, whether or not they
were made part of a public record. It is, of course, difficult to imag-
ine that anyone would publicly try to persuade the Chairman by
reference to personal or financial advantages, or would be allowed
to succeed if he did, and that bears out my point that these are
wholly impermissible considerations. The third case may perhaps
be borderline, but I would be inclined to think that the illness of
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Pertschuk's daughter is relevant and is a permissible influence on
his judgment. I assume it would be legitimate to argue to Pert-
schuk in a public proceeding that children in general are being in-
duced by television advertising to ingest dangerous drugs. Person-
alizing the argument may be a bit tacky, but it is not legally
improper. The fourth case is different from each of the others be-
cause it does not indicate the source of any influence on Pert-
schuk's judgment. In itself, the speech does not tell us whether his
judgment was based on proper or improper considerations. At
most, it tells us simply that his opinions were sufficiently influ-
enced by something to induce him to make a judgment. Without
knowing anything more about what that influence was, I would not
disqualify him from a rulemaking proceeding, even though I con-
cede he would be subject to disqualification given such circum-
stances if the pending proceeding were an adjudication. 4
Brutus
Your argument about the importance of the source of bias has
appeal. I also agree that the fourth case clearly would present
grounds for disqualification under existing legal precedent applica-
ble to adjudicatory cases. But your analysis does not tell us why
the same basic principle is not transferable to rulemaking. If the
administrator's participation would be unfair in one context, it
would be equally unfair in the other. And as Justice Hans Linde
has persuasively argued, even the legislature must comply with
some basic due process standards," which I assume would include
the obligation to make rational, unbiased decisions. If this is true,
agencies, which cannot be delegated more power than the legisla-
ture itself possesses, must be subject to standards that are at least
equally vigorous.
84 Thus, in American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966), FTC Chair-
man Dixon was disqualified on the ground that he had previously participated, as chief
counsel of a Senate subcommittee, in an investigation of the case. The court emphasized
that Dixon's prior position as counsel for the subcommittee did not in itself require disqual-
ification, but his active, in-depth involvement in the investigation did. This is consistent
with what appears to be the general rule regarding prior active participation in investigative
or prosecutorial activities related to an adjudication. See, e.g., American Gen. Ins. Co. v.
FTC, 589 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1979) (FTC commissioner disqualified because of prior partici-
pation in case as counsel, including argument before court of appeals); Amos Treat & Co. v.
SEC, 306 F.2d 260, 266-67 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (SEC commissioner disqualified because of pre-
vious participation in investigation of case).
85 See Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197 (1976).
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Publius
Your argument exaggerates the point. Even Justice Linde does
not go so far. On the one hand, he argues there are no judicially
enforceable standards of rationality or fairness in legislative law-
making; on the other, he maintains that there are some standards
of procedural regularity and of basic democratic "legitimacy" with
which the legislature must comply.8 s What does this mean? There
are, of course, certain procedural and institutional prerequisites to
making law, such as compliance with quorum and majority vote
requirements. But these essentially jurisdictional formalities do
not constitute "due process" in any relevant sense. They do not
impose any enforceable requirements of rationality or fairness on
legislative deliberations. At most they simply prescribe the
mechanical details of how laws are legitimately enacted. If legisla-
tive activity does not follow the prescribed processes for enacting a
law-for example, if the legislature votes on a measure without a
required quorum-then such activity does not produce a valid law.
This is quite different from saying that a law passed with all requi-
site formalities is invalid if, for example, the legislators did not al-
low for public participation or were influenced by improper con-
tacts with special interests.
As regards Justice Linde's standard of "legitimacy," I question
whether the concept is meaningful except as it is embodied in par-
ticular constitutional restraints (against, for example, denial of
equal protection or abridgment of free speech). Professor Ely not-
withstanding, 7 I would not classify such constitutional limitations
as process restraints. In any case, they do not deal with due pro-
cess in the sense relevant here. They do not prescribe standards for
lawmaking process; rather, they proscribe certain types of legisla-
84 A major burden of Justice Linde's analysis is to show that there should not be judi-
cial enforcement of legislative rationality in terms of a due process requirement that would
insist on a rational relationship between legislative means and articulated legislative pur-
pose. See id. at 201-22. He emphasizes that lawmakers should not be expected or required
to pursue their goals in a rational manner, or even to pursue goals that are themselves ra-
tional. Id. at 222-35. Justice Linde goes on to insist, however, that there are some standards
of legitimacy involving the process by which laws are enacted and implies that, at least in
certain instances, these standards should be judicially enforced. Id. at 235-51. Thus, his
thesis is that substantive due process is a chimera, and that courts have no business over-
turning laws they regard as irrational. Rather, they should overturn only those failing to
meet inherent procedural standards. See id. at 238-39, 241.
17 See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). Ely's process rationalization is chal-
lenged in Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
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tion. If that were what Justice Linde meant by his "legitimacy"
concept, I would have no quarrel with him. But he appears to have
in mind some general concept of lawmaking legitimacy not tied to
particular substantive constitutional constraints.8  I question
whether that concept has any usefulness in the absence of a clearer
definition of what it means and how it is to be enforced. 9
Brutus
I do not think you can dismiss the concept of "legitimacy" on
the ground that it is not legally enforceable. That the Supreme
Court has indicated doubt about its power to invalidate a law pro-
cured by bribery,90 for example, attests only to the limits of judi-
cial scrutiny of legislative process. As Justice Linde observes, it
does not mean that bribery is an acceptable element of the legisla-
tive process.9 1
Your response, moreover, leaves-too wide a gap in the struc-
tural support for agency action. Justice Holmes once observed that
"[m]en must turn square corners when they deal with the Govern-
ment. ' 92 That principle may adequately express the formal,
mechanical requirements for obtaining a tax refund. As a general
principle of democratic government, however, Holmes's dictum is
upside down: it is the government that ought to turn square cor-
ners in dealing with its citizens. In a democratic society, govern-
ment is entitled to claim the assent of its citizens only to the ex-
tent that public officials seek to advance some general public
interest rather than their own private advantage. "Turning square
corners" in this sense is the core consideration that makes the so-
cial contract binding. To me, this means that pulic officials must
be concerned with shared values of rationality, or relating means to
legitimate public ends, and fairness, or taking all interests into ac-
See note 86 supra.
89 Justice Linde himself is unclear about what he means by legitimacy. He never really
defines the term, other than to assert that it embraces "a very concrete, well understood set
of institutional procedures," which he does not specify. Linde, supra note 85, at 241; see id.
at 240-42.
90 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 129-31 (1810); cf. Daniel v. Family Security
Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 (1949) (refusal to consider lower court finding that legisla-
tion was procured by insurance lobby in order to eliminate competing business because "a
judiciary must judge by results, not by the varied factors which may have determined legis-
lators' votes. We cannot undertake a search for motive in testing constitutionality.").
" Linde, supra note 85, at 248.
92 Rock Island, Ark. & L.R.R. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920) (failure to file
appeal with Commissioner of Internal Revenue barred suit for tax refund).
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count in making decisions. Whether such a standard of legitimacy
is practically or legally enforceable is a secondary question, if in-
deed it is important at all.
Publius
I cannot find any clause in my copy of the social contract that
directs legislators to turn square corners. Without attempting to
delve into social philosophy in general or contractarian theory in
particular, I would question your assumptions about what people
expect or should expect of their lawmakers. Consider, for example,
the views of Justice Black, himself an ex-legislator, in Eastern
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. 3
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Black, held that a concerted
effort by a group of railroads to influence the legislature to enact
laws harmful to their competitors was not a violation of the anti-
trust laws even though the lobbying campaign involved distortion
and manufacture of facts as well as deception of the public.9
While criticizing that conduct, Justice Black observed that such a
" 'no-holds-barred fight' between two industries both of which are
seeking control of a profitable source of income... [is] common-
place in the halls of legislative bodies."9 5 I take this statement as
more than a disclaimer of judicial competence to intervene; I think
it clearly reflects Black's view of the accepted norms of legislative
process. This implies that legislative decisions based on such dis-
torted, unfair premises-that is, biased decisions-are permissible.
It is true, of course, that legislatures have adopted some stan-
dards for themselves, such as conflict-of-interest rules.9" But these
standards are not often enforced by the legislatures.97 Basically,
"3 365 U.S. 127 (1961). Linde, supra note 85, at 227, cites the case to illustrate the
absence of enforceable due process standards of rationality in lawmaking. See also UMW v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-70 (1965).
94 365 U.S. at 140. But see California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508, 512-13 (1972).
"5 365 U.S. at 144 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Noerr Motor Freight v. Eastern R.R.
Presidents Conference, 273 F.2d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 1959) (Biggs, C.J., dissenting)).
"See note 77 supra.
97 See Kirby, Federal Conflict of Interest Regulations and Their Relation to Official
Compensation in THE REWARDS oF PUBLIC SERvicE 165, 186-201 (R. Hartman & A. Weber
eds. 1980); Note, supra note 77, at 1223. It has been urged that courts can and should
enforce legislative ethics rules. Id. at 1214. The courts have declined the invitation, however,
at least in the context of disqualifying legislators from participation in the enactment of
laws. In cases where the proscribed conduct is made criminal, see id. at 1224-27, prosecution
of the individual legislator presumably is always possible. Unfortunately, that does not seem
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enforcement of legislative rationality, fairness, "legitimacy," or
whatever catch phrase you wish to use, is left to the elector-
ate-which to all appearances does not insist on a very high stan-
dard of behavior.98 Mark Twain once wrote that it "could probably
be shown by facts and figures that there is no distinctly native
American criminal class except Congress." 99 The quip reflects, even
if it distorts, a widely shared public contempt for legislative ethics.
Brutus
I will concede-indeed, who could deny-that legislators are
not always high-minded guardians who act only out of a sense of
the public good. Nonetheless, I see no reason why we should not
insist that legislators, like all other public officials, be held ac-
countable to some kind of standards. If there is a risk of error in
setting such standards, we should err on the side of rationality and
fairness.
Publius
I did not mean to suggest that I apply no standards to laws.
Idealist that I am, I even believe some rationality and fairness can
be constitutionally demanded in terms of substantive due process
and equal protection requirements. 100 But I have few if any expec-
tations for individual lawmakers. I think it is feckless to try to en-
force standards of legislator behavior other than-Twain's hypoth-
esis notwithstanding-minimal honesty. To the extent one expects
rational and fair processes, one must look to the system, not to
particular legislators. It is another example of an invisible hand at
work. The social utility-the fairness, if you will-of the end result
depends more on the successful interaction of different, competing
to be a promising mechanism for effective enforcement of legislative due process; it is too
cumbersome and it would still leave the law involved in effect.
" See, e.g., 36 CONG. Q. 2975, 3286 (1978) (reelection of Congressman Charles Diggs
after conviction for payroll kickbacks); 25 id. 600 (1967) (reelection of Congressman Adam
Clayton Powell after exclusion from House for improper conduct). But see 38 id. 3317
(1980) (five of six congressmen involved in Abscam scandal defeated in reelection contests).
See also G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 619-67 (2d
ed. 1980).
"S. CLEMENS, FOLLOWING THE EQUATOR 80 (1897).
100 In particular, requiring a rational relationship between a law and its purported pur-
pose, which would encourage legislative candor rather than obfuscation, might be required
by equal protection analysis. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972).
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individual interests than on legislators' selfless dedication to the
public interest. We might, therefore, even want to encourage the
advocacy of particular points of view rather than banning it as evi-
dence of bias. I grant you the political marketplace does not work
in exactly the same fashion as the economic market.10 1 Sometimes
it works better, sometimes worse. But I am more interested in the
soundness of the end result, which in either market depends only
slightly, if at all, on the purity, or even the rationality, of the indi-
vidual actors.102
Brutus
We have gone somewhat astray in talking about legislative due
process when in fact we are really interested in administrative due
process in agency rulemaking. As I pointed out earlier, any inher-
ent due process limitations on legislative actions would apply a pri-
ori to agency rulemaking, inasmuch as an agency cannot be dele-
gated more power than the legislature has to begin with. But even
if we were to decide that there are no due process standards of
rationality and fairness in legislative lawmaking, that does not nec-
essarily mean that there are none for agency rulemaking.103
Publius
Are we talking about constitutional due process or due process
prescribed by the legislature? If the former, I do not see where the
standards come from. Such Supreme Court precedent as we have
suggests that there are no such guidelines.10 If the latter, you must
be more specific about the statutory source. I grant you that a leg-
101 For comparisons and contrasts, see Stigler, Economic Competition and Political
Competition, 13 PuB. CHOMP 91 (1972). See generally A. B=rON, Tnm ECONOMIC THEORY Op
REPRESENTATE GOVERNMENT (1974).
120 Cf. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211
(1950) (rationality in economic marketplace).
'0 See Linde, supra note 85, at 225-27.
10 See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1979) (licensing board made up of mem-
bers of only one of competing factions allowed to promulgate rules notwithstanding claim of
economic self-interest); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441
(1915) (hearing not required before board promulgates rule increasing valuation of all tax-
able property in county). In contrast, the Court has not hesitated to impose due process
requirements on adjudication and quasi-adjudicative administrative proceedings. Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1973) (board members with conflicting pecuniary interests
cannot constitutionally participate in a licensing hearing); accord, cases cited note 84 supra.
But see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58 (1975) (relying on federal administrative law to
uphold combination of investigative and adjudicative functions).
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islature may prescribe for agencies any rulemaking due process
that it wishes. But I remind you of the Supreme Court's decision
in Vermont Yankee instructing the courts not to add special pro-
cess requirements to those prescribed by Congress.10 5
Brutus
It is true that statutory prescriptions are the most obvious
source of rulemaking due process requirements, and I accept your
challenge to provide specifics. We can set Vermont Yankee aside,
however, because in the present context it is a red herring. That
case dealt only with the question of whether special procedures can
be judicially imposed on rulemaking. I am not concerned with spe-
cial adjudicatory procedures and standards imposed on rulemaking
by a court, but rather with those requirements imposed by Con-
gress itself. It has established minimum requirements of notice,
comment, and rationality for rulemaking,108 all of which would ef-
fectively be overridden if the rulemaker became an advocate with a
closed mind. Congress did not mandate this procedure only to have
it essentially ignored at the first opportunity.107 In the case of the
rulemaking involved in National Advertisers, Congress, in the
Magnuson-Moss Act, added requirements that adjudicative-type
hearings be held on any disputed issues of material fact.108 More-
over, any action taken in such rulemaking must satisfy the sub-
stantial evidence test instead of the supposedly less rigorous arbi-
trary and capricious test normally used to review informal
rulemaking.109 Taken together, these requirements seem to indi-
cate a fairly strong congressional intent to impose rigorous stan-
dards of discipline on FTC commissioners in trade regulation
rulemaking proceedings. But it simply makes no sense to require
that determinations of material fact be subject to the rigors of a
105 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 542-48 (1978).
10- 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
107 See Preston, A Right of Rebuttal in Informal Rulemaking: May Courts Impose Pro-
cedures to Ensure Rebuttal of Ex Parte Communications and Information Derived from
Agency Files after Vermont Yankee?, 32 An. L. Rzv. 621 (1980).
108 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1976). For legislative explanations of the Act's purpose, see S.
CoNs. REP. No. 1408, 93d Cong., 2d Seas., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws
7755; H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEws 7702. A similar hybrid-rulemaking procedure was mandated for the OSHA rulemak-
ing involved in the United Steelworkers case. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(3) (1976).
109 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(3)(A) (1976). The same requirement was present in the United
Steelworkers case. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976).
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hearing and the substantial evidence test without also requiring
that the triers of fact be untainted by bias.
Publius
So far as the special procedures created by Magnuson-Moss
are concerned, the evidence of congressional intent is ambiguous at
best. As Judge Tamm indicates, 110 the legislative history suggests
that the hearing procedures were intended to apply only to "spe-
cific" or "adjudicative" facts pertaining to particular parties, not to
"legislative" facts about broad policy issues-such as the impact of
advertising on children. Clearly Pertschuk's "bias" is directed to
the latter and so does not contravene the purpose of the additional
procedural requirements.
Brutus
I do not find the adjudicative-legislative fact distinction,
which the court borrows from Professor Davis, particularly helpful
in this context."' The crucial point is that if bias is involved in
either case, the proposed rules may rest on assumptions that are
both disputed and critical. In addition, as Judge MacKinnon
points out, the legislative history is susceptible to an interpretation
that does not support such a distinction. 112
Publius
I was not arguing for a legislative-adjudicative fact test; I was
merely pointing out that Congress seems to have mandated it. In
order to carry out the legislative intent behind the Magnuson-Moss
procedures, we must therefore interpret the meaning of the dis-
tinction. If you look at what the FTC Chairman actually said, I
think it is clear that his statements are more "legislative" in char-
acter than "adjudicative."
110 627 F.2d at 1163-64.
"I See Gellhorn, Rules of Evidence and Official Notice in Formal Administrative
Hearings, 1971 DuKa L.J. 1, 47; Jaffe, Administrative Procedure Re-Examined: The Benja-
min Report, 56 HARv. L. Rav. 704, 719 (1943); Robinson, supra note 3, at 494, 536.
11' See 627 F.2d at 1183-84 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)
(legislative history indicates Magnuson-Moss procedures are applicable to all FTC
rulemaking).
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Brutus
Let us put aside the narrow question of congressional intent in
the Magnuson-Moss Act and return to the broader issue of gener-
ally applicable due process standards. As I read Judge MacKin-
non's dissent, he would be prepared to require at least some mini-
mal impartiality of agency members in traditional informal
rulemaking proceedings. It is noteworthy that even Judge Tamm
assumes that some degree of impartiality is necessary in all
rulemaking.113 But he insists on a lower standard of impartial-
ity-or at least on a higher burden of proof of bias-for rulemak-
ing than for adjudication.114 How do you justify a different stan-
dard for the two types of proceedings?
Publius
I do not want to explain Judge Tamm's distinction; in fact I
am not sure I fully understand it. I concede that even in rulemak-
ing, agency officials ought to be held to some minimal standard of
impartiality. I think it would be intolerable to permit a rulemaker
to have a personal stake in the decision. For example, an official
who has a pecuniary interest in a particular outcome should be dis-
qualified. Such cases are not very interesting, however, and they
are fully taken care of by conflict-of-interest statutes.11 5 Further-
more, I see no basis in law or policy for moving beyond this mini-
mal, legislatively prescribed limit.
Brutus
This disparate treatment of adjudication and rulemaking re-
sults in a very curious ethic. A different standard is applied to the
same official, and possibly even to the same types of regulatory de-
cisions, depending on which mechanism the agency chooses-that
is, essentially on how the agency chooses to label its own actions.11 6
I take it that the FTC could have pursued its proposed children's
113 Id. at 1174.
114 Id. at 1161-70.
"I See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1976), quoted in note 77 supra.
1'6 Compare SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 92-93 (1943) with SEC v.
Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 201-03 (1947). In Chenery I, the Court stated
that the decision-making processes for rulemaking and adjudication would be judged by
different standards. The impact of that decision was undercut by the subsequent decision in
Chenery II, which held that the practical effect of adjudication and rulemaking need not
differ and that an agency was free to choose either.
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advertising policy by means of individual adjudications.117 In fact,
before the Octane Posting Case118 held, in a somewhat expansive
interpretation of the statutes, that the agency had rulemaking
powers, there was doubt whether it could have proceeded in any
other way.11 9 Let us suppose the FTC were to decide to promulgate
part of its children's advertising policy by way of adjudication and
part by way of rulemaking. Participating in the former, Chairman
Pertschuk must emulate Calpurnia in being above suspicion; in the
latter, it is quite enough if, imitating Richard Nixon, he can assert
that he is not a crook.
Publius
I would say there is nothing peculiar about the existence of
two sets of standards. That is precisely the point of differentiating
between rulemaking and adjudication. We have different proce-
dures, different standards of "proof," and different standards of
review, because of the different characteristics of the processes.
The analogy between agency rules and congressional legislation is
again instructive. Congress may pass a law laying down a "rule"
identical in substance to what a court or agency might achieve
through the radically different process of adjudication, just as an
agency could achieve the same result through rulemaking. Yet
surely you would not wish to disqualify legislators for having previ-
ously formed an opinion, or even for being biased, on the issue. For
example, suppose that a congressional committee considers pro-
posed legislation banning or limiting children's advertising in pre-
cisely the manner proposed by the FTC: is a senator barred from
participation because of past statements for or against such rules?
Of course not. Legislators are elected in part on the basis of their
past advocacy. Disqualification on such grounds would undermine
democracy.
Brutus
I think Judge MacKinnon has already answered your latter
point: agency rulemaking is not lawmaking and agency administra-
tors are not congressmen.120 As I have already noted (and you con-
11 See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
is National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974).
"I See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 3, at 492.
120 627 F.2d at 1194.
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veniently ignored), an agency is a mere creature of Congress. As a
result, it must act within a set of prescribed rules and standards to
which Congress itself is not subject.
Publius
Now who is introducing the red herring? I agree that agency
rulemakers are bound by standards and procedures not applicable
to legislators. But such standards can only be set by the legislature
itself. Congress is of course free to prescribe standards of imparti-
ality for rulemaking that are the same as those applied to adjudi-
cation, but where has it done so?
Brutus
The fact that Congress has not explicitly established stan-
dards of impartiality for rulemaking is not dispositive. It has not
done so for administrative adjudication either, yet those standards
clearly exist.121 What Congress has done, for both types of proceed-
ings, is to prescribe certain formalities designed to limit and ra-
tionalize the exercise of administrative discretion. Although the
procedures in notice-and-comment rulemaking are not as strictly
confining as those required in adjudication or hybrid rulemaking,
their basic design and effect is similar. In all cases, an agency must
explain the basis of its action; likewise, it is subject to at least min-
imal standards of rationality in all cases.122 Now what is the point
of imposing such constraints if agency members may in fact rest
their decisions on extraneous influences, bias, and the like?
Publius
Given such a principle of statutory construction, I think you
could argue that all rulemaking is implicitly subject to all of the
basic procedural requirements imposed on adjudication. I do not
say that there is no judicial support for such an approach; Home
Box Office is close on point. But that case is a very uncertain pre-
cedent.123 Additionally, the finding of implicit statutory procedural
requirements is suspect after Vermont Yankee. Most importantly,
See, e.g., Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 429 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir.
1970); 2 DAVIs TRAris , supra note 29, § 12.01.
122 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 557, 706 (1976).
123 See text and notes at notes 54-62 supra.
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it is unclear whether so narrow and rigid an approach to rulemak-
ing is desirable.
In any case, whatever you may infer from legislative intent in
creating minimal standards of fairness and rationality, it remains
true that Congress has in fact prescribed different, and signifi-
cantly less stringent, procedures for rulemaking than for adjudica-
tion.12 4 Furthermore, the courts have encouraged the use of these
more liberal procedures.12 5 Deciding whether these procedures, like
the stricter standards imposed on rulemaking, inherently imply an
impartiality requirement comes down to a question of expecta-
tions. My reason for analogizing agency rulemakers to congres-
sional lawmakers, and hence imposing only a minimal impartiality
standard, is that I think we have essentially similar expectations
about permissible behavior for both groups when they are func-
tioning in their "legislative-rulemaking" capacity.'26
Brutus
You cannot transform agency members into congressmen by
putting a hyphen between the words legislative and rulemaking. If
the question of fairness is indeed rested on public expectations,
your argument clearly fails. The expectation is not the same for
agency rulemakers and legislators. As you yourself emphasized ear-
lier, we tolerate and even expect partisanship in the case of legisla-
tors. It is understood that they are elected to represent particular
constituencies and interest groups. But administrators, such as the
five regulatory commissioners of the FTC, do not quite a legisla-
ture make. They are not elected, they are not representative, and
we do not expect them to behave as advocates for particular con-
stituencies or interests.'27 In fact, we are shocked and offended
when they do so, which is why an impartiality requirement is
necessary.
M Compare 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976) (rulemaking) with id. § 554 (adjudication).
15 For judicial encomiums to the virtues of the rulemaking process, see, e.g., National
Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 670-84 (D.C. Cir. 1973); American Airlines,
Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 629-30 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966). See also
Mayton, The Legislative Resolution of the Rulemaking versus Adjudication Problem in
Agency Lawmaking, 1980 DuKE L.J. 103.
,' For a more complete statement of this argument, see Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspec-
tives on Administrative Law, 75 CoLuM. L. REV. 771, 778-79 (1975) (forcing "the agencies
into a judicial mode that is incongruous with the legislative function they are expected to
perform... is potentially mischievous").
"I See 627 F.2d at 1192-94 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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Publius
Let me raise two practical questions. First, if a regulatory
commissioner is not supposed to represent a particular constituent
interest, how did Chairman Pertschuk, for example, get appointed
in the first place? I will not pretend that every regulator is picked
specifically to represent some interest group.128 In the case of Pert-
schuk, however, there was no doubt at the time of his appointment
that he was a strong consumer advocate whose constituency clearly
included the group that pressed for the ban on advertising directed
at children. 129 Nor was any concern about such "bias" expressed
publicly before his appointment. It would even seem probable that
his appointment was in large part the result of a desire to have
such a partisan on the Commission. It would be highly ironic, and
hardly rational, to appoint a known consumer advocate to the post
and then to decry his publicizing that advocacy. Let us suppose
that Pertschuk made the challenged statements the day before his
confirmation hearing. Do you think the Senate would have with-
held confirmation? If not, on what basis do we now disqualify him
when the FTC moves to put his ideas into action?
My second practical question concerns what you expect to ac-
complish by disqualifying administrators who reveal their biases in
public. Does disqualification ensure impartiality or merely its ap-
pearance? In the immediate case, we presumably remove the bi-
ased decision maker. But what effect will this have on future deci-
sions? The decision maker's basic biases are unlikely to change,
but unless he is extremely obtuse he will think twice about making
them public before the completion of any future proceeding in
which they might be grounds for disqualification. Thus, Pert-
schuk's speeches would no doubt continue even if he had been dis-
qualified, but always with just enough of the sharp edges rounded
to remove any basis for subsequent challenges.
Keep in mind that biased views or conflicts of interest are, in
practice, provable only by evidence of what the decision maker has
said or done, not by proof of what he thinks. Even if we were will-
ing to believe the decision maker's potentially self-serving account
of his own mental processes, we would be unable to obtain it. Mor-
128 See generally STAFF oF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., Ap-
POINTMENTS TO THE REGULATORY AGENCIES: THE FCC AND FTC (1949-74) (Comm. Print
1976).
129 See N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1977, § 4, at 1, col. 4.
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gan IV1 30 says a decision maker cannot be examined to determine
whether he gave personal attention to the issues, because of the
need to preserve the integrity of the administrative process.131 I
take it that the same principle would prevent examining a decision
maker concerning possible bias. In consequence, once decision
makers were aware of the rule, they would render it nugatory by
restricting their public statements.
Brutus
If your latter argument proves anything, it proves too much.
The same point could be made of disqualification for bias in adju-
dicatory cases such as Cinderella. If the difficulties of proof can be
surmounted in the one context, they can also be overcome in the
other.
As to the other point, it raises a question of line drawing. I
assume Pertschuk was expected to reflect a consumer bent. That
is, he was expected to have a generalized bias in favor of govern-
ment intervention on behalf of the consumer. Had he done no
more than demonstrate such a philosophy, he would not have been
subject to disqualification, even in an adjudicatory case. But Pert-
schuk expressed an impermissible degree and type of bias when he
indicated that he was committed to a particular disposition of an
issue before him in his official capacity. Although agency members
may be chosen for their particular philosophical orientation, that
does not mean that they may be so closed-minded that they cannot
or will not seriously consider all points of view. This line that I
would draw to separate the permissible from the impermissible
may not be bright, but at least it is intelligible and uniform. It is
crossed when one becomes a protagonist actively seeking to build
support for one's beliefs. The important point, in short, is not
whether an agency member holds strong views, but whether he has
become an advocate or in some other fashion (such as by accepting
a bribe) left himself little or no room to make a reasoned judgment
on the basis of the evidence produced at the proceeding.13 2
SO United States v. Morgan (Morgan IV), 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
131 Id. at 422.
M" See text and notes at notes 80-83 supra. See also FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683,
701 (1948).
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Publius
I think you may have just unwittingly embraced Judge
Tamm's "unalterably closed mind" standard for impartiality in
rulemaking,133 which you originally purported to reject. As to
whether my burden of proof argument undercuts the present adju-
dicatory standard, it probably does. That does not trouble me as
much as it does you. Moreover, I think that one can construct a
plausible case for enforcing the adjudicatory standard of bias all
the same. The need for such a standard clearly is greater in adjudi-
cation than in rulemaking. This is reflected in the traditional dis-
parity between the stringency of the requirements imposed on ju-
dicial and legislative bias. Given the greater need, we should be
less deterred by the evidentiary complexities. Also, we expect
judges, unlike legislators, not to exhibit partisan opinions. We
should therefore make a greater effort to deter such statements by
an administrator in his capacity as adjudicator than in his capacity
as rulemaker.
In rulemaking, however, the point is that we really want
agency decision makers to speak out on general issues of policy. I
meant what I said earlier about letting "the bull" out. If I were an
advertiser, I might not like what Pertschuk had to say about chil-
dren's advertising, but I would rather have it publicly acknowl-
edged than suppressed. Either way I would feel the impact of the
opinion, in that it would be equally influential in Pertschuk's deci-
sion. But in the former situation, I at least have a warning; I would
know what I was up against and could proceed accordingly. There
are more than enough incentives for agency members to play it
safe in what they say and make banal pronouncements about "the
public interest" that tell little about what the officials actually in-
tend to do. I do not want to add to these incentives. I therefore see
no advantage in sanding down the ragged edges of an agency mem-
ber's tongue, just because he wags it in public.
Finally, it is important to remember that, whatever the biases
of the rulemaker, his rules still must be explained on rational
grounds, which are subject to judicial review."'
Brutus
Let me suggest that you might not want to have biases made
133 627 F.2d at 1170.
134 5 U.S.C. §§ 557, 706 (1976).
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public if the effect is to make it difficult for the decision maker to
change his mind. Common intuition tells me that once a person
has made a public commitment, it will be more difficult to per-
suade him to change his views than if he harbors them in private.
As to your point about judicial review, I thought you wanted
to talk in practical terms. You know as well as I that the standards
of review-whether the substantial evidence or the arbitrary and
capricious test-accord the decision maker considerable discretion
with regard to the final outcome. But judicial review of rationality
cannot reach impermissible influences leading the decision maker
to exercise his discretion in favor of one of two rational alterna-
tives. The point of disqualification is to ensure that this discretion
will not be unduly influenced by factors outside the "record." In
this regard, disqualification serves the same due process objective
as the rule banning ex parte contacts.
III. THE Ex PARTE PROBLEM
Publius
Well, we have finally found a point on which we fully agree,
namely, that bias and ex parte issues are related. Both raise similar
basic questions about due process and the character of agency
rulemaking. But the two issues are nevertheless distinct. For one
thing, the Home Box Office ban on ex parte contacts presents legal
problems not raised by the bias issue. Specifically, in Vermont
Yankee the Supreme Court emphatically instructed the court of
appeals that "[a]bsent constitutional constraints or extremely com-
pelling circumstances,"135 agencies could not be required to follow
procedures beyond those set forth by Congress in the APA (or,
presumably, in an agency's authorizing statute). Inasmuch as a rule
against ex parte contacts, unlike a rule requiring impartiality, nec-
essarily results in procedural requirements, this language threatens
the continued vitality of Home Box Office. The Vermont Yankee
Court went on to note that additional procedures could not be jus-
tified on the grounds that "a more adequate record . . . will give
interested parties more of an opportunity to participate and con-
tribute to the proceedings."" 6 This statement undercuts the prin-
cipal policy justification for the ban on ex parte contacts.
135 435 U.S. at 543.
136 Id. at 547.
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Brutus
Although I would accept your implied conclusion that neither
constitutional constraints nor compelling circumstances bar
outside contact with agency rulemakers, I do not think Vermont
Yankee will carry all the freight you want to load on it. The Court
there recognized that rules are still subject to review under the
APA's arbitrariness standard to determine whether they are "sus-
tainable on the administrative record made"; 1 7 this review, which
the APA states may be of the "whole record,"1"8 can examine
everything before the agency decision maker, including all ex parte
contacts." 9 An effort to control ex parte contacts in rulemaking is
therefore well within the traditional role of judicial oversight man-
dated by Congress. The Home Box Office rule can be explained,
consistently with Vermont Yankee, as expressing the determina-
tion that the existence of ex parte contacts means that a rule could
never be sustained on the record.
Publius
If that is true, is it not true as well of other judicial require-
ments for rulemaking, such as the very requirements that the court
invalidated in Vermont Yankee?1 40
Brutus
Perhaps, and that is one reason why Vermont Yankee is un-
likely to have the impact on judicial activism in this area that
some have supposed.14 1 In any case, I do not think that we can
simply dismiss Home Box Office on the strength of Vermont
Yankee.1 42
137 Id. at 549.
118 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976) ("In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall re-
view the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party"); see United States v. Nova
Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 249 (2d Cir. 1977).
139 United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519, 541-42 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 54-55 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
140 This seems to be the inference drawn by Professor Stewart. See Stewart, supra note
64, at 1821.
141 See, e.g., Nathanson, supra note 20, at 406. See also 1 DAvis TREATIsE, supra note
29, §§ 6.35-.37 (2d ed. 1978).
142 See text and notes at notes 62-63 supra.
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Publius
A moment ago you stressed that the ex parte and bias
problems were closely related. How, then, do you reconcile Home
Box Office and National Advertisers?
Brutus
If National Advertisers had gone the other way, it would have
provided compelling support for Home Box Office. A requirement
of neutrality surely demands the inference that clandestine ex-
trarecord influences cannot be allowed. On the other hand, I think
I can justify a ban on ex parte contacts in rulemaking even though
agency rulemakers are not disqualified for most bias. In other
words, I think Home Box Office can coexist with the actual deci-
sion in National Advertisers. The former case attempts to ensure
the integrity of the rulemaking process as far as practicable by
confining basic evidence to that produced "on the record"; the lat-
ter merely accepts your implicit belief in the futility of also trying
to ensure a truly neutral decision maker, and prevents the waste of
judicial resources on such an impossible task.
Publius
Saying that Home Box Office is necessary to ensure the integ-
rity of the rulemaking process begs the question. Ex parte contacts
during notice-and-comment rulemaking were commonplace at the
FCC and other agencies before Home Box Office, and no one as-
serted that such contacts impeached the integrity of rulemaking.148
The court in Home Box Office necessarily admitted to making new
law in this respect. 44
Brutus
It is hardly the first time-particularly for that court. Surely
you are not going to argue that the courts cannot make new law.
Publius
No, but the fact that the agencies constantly engaged in ex
parte consultations on issues of policy confronting them in
rulemaking proceedings without evoking any complaints is clearly
4' See text and note at note 42 supra.
144 567 F.2d at 54.
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relevant to the question of whether such contacts compromise. the
integrity of the process.
Brutus
You exaggerate the unanimity of acceptance for this practice.
The Sangamon Valley case145 would never have been brought nor
decided as it was if ex parte contacts were regarded as wholly in-
nocuous. That the issue of a general ban on ex parte contacts is
only now squarely before the courts is probably the result of the
same several factors that explain the recent emergence of the bias
issue for the first time: the relative newness of agency use of
rulemaking to develop important policy issues; an increased con-
cern with open government; and a more active judicial role in re-
viewing agency action in general and rulemaking in particular.
Thus I would not put much reliance on the old test-of-time crite-
rion. It may seem surprising that such basic issues of due process
are emerging as questions of first impression this late in the game.
But most of the jurisprudence of administrative due process is the
creation of the last thirty years.146
Publius
Obviously courts can and do change the law not only to ac-
commodate changing social needs but also to reflect changing so-
cial and ethical norms. I only meant to suggest that this new ethic
created by Home Box Office is indeed new. You cannot find much
precedent, by the way, in Sangamon Valley. That opinion not only
stated a limited principle (the restriction applied only to "conflict-
ing private claims to a valuable privilege ' '147 ) but it also applied
that principle in a very special rulemaking context-a narrowly fo-
cused rule that directly affected only a few parties. In fact, the pro-
ceeding in Sangamon Valley was in substance an adjudicatory con-
test to determine which of two private parties would receive the
145 Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1959);
see text and notes at notes 44-48 supra.
M The jurisprudence involving administrative rulemaking is illustrative. See cases
cited notes 5-14 supra. Another, even more striking example is the development of a right to
a hearing in cases involving intangible interests and entitlements such as occupational free-
dom, welfare benefits, and educational opportunity. See cases collected in G. ROBINsON, E.
GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, supra note 98, at 611-822.
" 269 F.2d at 224.
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privilege of using a particular television channel. 148 By contrast,
the rulemaking in Home Box Office involved rules of extremely
wide application, affecting a broad array of different interests.149
Only by an exercise of the purest legal fantasy can the issues and
circumstances involved in Home Box Office and Sangamon Valley
be deemed comparable. For this reason, I am not at all satisfied
with either Judge MacKinnon's separate opinion in Home Box Of-
fice or Judge Tamm's opinion in ACT insofar as they suggest that
Home Box Office can be limited to Sangamon Valley-type situa-
tions. If the proceeding in Home Box Office is an appropriate occa-
sion for invoking the Sangamon Valley principle, it is difficult to
imagine what rulemaking proceedings would not qualify.
Brutus
I agree that the facts of Home Box Office are quite different
from those of Sangamon Valley. But treating the former as an ap-
plication of the latter does provide at least a potential means of
limiting the future application of the ex parte ban. Surely that
should satisfy you.
Publius
I would be more satisfied to see Home Box Office recognized
14 See text and notes at notes 45-47 supra. Compare Sangamon Valley Television
Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1959) with Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC,
326 U.S. 327 (1945). The latter is an adjudication that also involved a conflict between two
private parties for the privilege of operating on the same frequency in two different cities.
There is no fundamental difference in the nature and scope of the issues involved in
Ashbacker and Sangamon Valley. The use of rulemaking in one case and adjudication in
the other was instead based on the agency's procedural convention. Sangamon Valley in-
volved a change in the FCC's previously established table of television assignments, and
such changes typically have been accomplished by rulemaking prior to the licensing of indi-
vidual stations; AM radio assignments, such as that involved in Ashbacker, have been made
largely on an ad hoc basis as part of the licensing of individual stations. It is noteworthy
that several early deintermixture cases similar to Sangamon Valley were decided in adjudi-
catory proceedings. See, e.g., Peoria Deintermixture Case, 22 F.C.C. 342 (1957); Springfield
Deintermixture Case, 22 F.C.C. 318 (1957).
"' The importance and wide effect of these rules can be gauged by the number of dif-
ferent groups that filed comments in the rulemaking. The list is a formidable one. It in-
cludes the motion picture and television production industry; several different sports inter-
ests (professional baseball, hockey, and basketball associations); theater owners and
operators; several cities; the Department of Justice; the Office of Telecommunications Policy
(then located in the Executive Office of the President); representatives of several minority
groups; the ACLU; other public interest groups; the Metropolitan Opera Company; and
others. Subscription Programming, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, 8-42 (1975).
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for what it purports to be: a flat ban on ex parte contacts in all
rulemaking. 150 Only then can the full ramifications of the case be
understood, and I hope, corrected.
Brutus
When you say corrected, I assume you mean the case should
be overturned.
Publius
I confess to ambivalence on that score. The absence of any
constraint on how and where agency officials obtain their informa-
tion bothers me. I have some sympathy for the argument made to
the court in Home Box Office that the ex parte contacts had cir-
cumvented the formalities prescribed to ensure reliability in oral
argument before the agency. 151 Similar consequences follow, I sup-
pose, whether or not there is oral argument. Whenever interested
persons are able to present their facts and arguments to individual
agency members and staff without notifying other parties, the
rulemaking process imposes no check on the reliability of informa-
tion presented to the decision makers. This raises obvious concerns
of fairness, as well as substantial problems of effectiveness and effi-
ciency, given the problems inherent in evaluating such informa-
tion. Allowing unfettered ex parte communications also under-
mines the incentive for interested persons to submit reliable,
carefully prepared documents because their work is so easily lost in
the shuffle of off-the-record encounters. Many regulatory policy
makers are forced to place great reliance on oral briefing and dis-
cussion because of the massive quantities of paper confronting
them. Because of this reliance, even the most carefully produced
commentary of one party can be negated by the offhand, ex parte
comments of another.
On the other hand, ex parte contacts also operate as an impor-
tant check on the reliability of staff information and interpreta-
tion. Given the potential unreliability of staff-provided informa-
tion, ex parte contacts with persons outside the agency are an
important means of avoiding "staff capture.' 52 To be sure, one
150 567 F.2d at 56-57.
161 Id. at 55-56.
152 See Wilson, The Dead Hand of Regulation, 25 PuB. INTREST 39, 48 (1971) ("If the
agencies have been 'captured' by anybody, it is probably by their staffs"). To the extent that
staff capture is a serious concern, the approach suggested in the United Steelworkers case,
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does not want an agency to rely entirely on outside informants, but
neither does one want it to be the prisoner of agency staff. Indeed,
depending on the rigor of the ex parte prohibition, the staff itself
may have difficulty obtaining information.
Brutus
I do not understand this concern about possibly inadequate
access to information. Surely the agency can ask that any informa-
tion it feels is necessary to or influential in its decision be submit-
ted on the record, where it is subject to public scrutiny and rebut-
tal as appropriate.
Publius
Your incomprehension results from your initial mischaracter-
ization of my concern. Obtaining information is not the problem.
Agencies seldom want for information or argument in a quantita-
tive sense. If anything, they suffer from the opposite, what Alvin
Toffier has described as "information overload. 15 3 If you examine
the docket in any major rulemaking, such as the proceeding at is-
sue in Home Box Office, you will see what I mean. What the
agency rulemaker needs is both a means to get to the heart of the
case, and an exchange of views with the advocates of competing
positions in which he can test his, and their, understanding of the
issues. It is somewhat ironic that one of the principal proponents
of a ban on ex parte contacts, Judge Wright, should also interpret
the APA as requiring rulemaking to provide "a genuine dialogue
between agency experts and concerned members of the public."' "
The formal submission of documents to an agency, in response to a
formal public notice, seems unlikely to constitute a "genuine" dia-
logue-but this would be the only permissible communication be-
tween the agency and the parties if the ban on ex parte contacts
stands.
The evils of this rigid formalism are obvious. For example, in
Home Box Office a key issue was whether relaxation of the then-
existing restrictions on pay-TV presentation of movies and sports
events would cause a "siphoning" of such programs from adver-
allowing such contacts by the agency staff but not by interested parties outside of the
agency, is exactly backwards.
253 See A. TOFFLER, FuTuRE SHOCK 311-15 (1970).
'" Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 375, 381 (1974).
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tiser-supported television to pay TV because of the supposedly
greater buying power (on a per viewer basis) of the latter. Suppose
an FCC commissioner wants clarification of a particular narrow is-
sue bearing on this question, such as the current cost of broadcast
television program procurement, but can find nothing in the moun-
tain of documents submitted by the parties that adequately ad-
dresses the point. Under the Home Box Office rule, his only re-
course is to make a formal request for information on this subject.
Presumably this would be done through public notice satisfying
the requirements of the APA, inviting comments. After several
months, and God knows what expenditure of time and money in
preparation of formal responses by the parties, the commissioner
may receive the information he desires-something he probably
could have gained in a half-hour conversation with one of the par-
ties. It is also possible that the parties will misunderstand the ini-
tial request and provide the wrong information, or respond in a
way that adds to the commissioner's confusion. This would require
a repetition of the entire wasteful formal process. In a normal con-
versation, of course, such inadequate responses could be pointed
out and remedied immediately.
I do not rest my argument for allowing informal, off-the-re-
cord communications solely on the need to obtain factual data,
however. More important is the need for a means enabling the
agency rulemaker to get behind the public positions of the differ-
ent interest groups to examine the intensity of their various de-
mands, and to explore possible compromises. In the absence of a
market for the sale of public choice decisions of the kind made in
rulemaking, we have no accurate way to evaluate the true demand
for different outcomes. Yet this is a vital component of rulemaking,
just as it is of legislative lawmaking. A conscientious rulemaker
wants to know not only who gains and loses from enactment of a
rule, but also by how much. More than that, the rulemaker will
want to consider compromises that can satisfy all of his different
interest constituents to the greatest extent possible. An agency is
not simply an issuer of edicts; it is also an arbitrator of interests.
Again Home Box Office is illustrative. Some of the ex parte con-
tacts involved in that case apparently took place partly for the
purpose of exploring possible compromises among the competing
groups.155 It is difficult to envision how such compromise efforts,
155 See 567 F.2d at 53, noting one meeting in which broadcast representatives described
the kind of pay-cable regulations "they could live with."
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which are clearly desirable, could be made without some informal
contacts.1 5 6 Surely you would not expect the Commission to at-
tempt to develop a compromise in a public forum. Such an attempt
at negotiating in public would be doomed to failure; no interest
group would be willing to retreat from its avowed positions in the
eye of public opinion.
Brutus
You make two quite different points. One concerns the essen-
tially mechanical problem of how best to obtain information; the
other raises the more complex question of what agencies are sup-
posed to do.
I think I can dispose of the second point by noting that the
rulemaker-as-arbitrator is not an appropriate model for agencies.
No doubt rules often reflect compromises among competing inter-
est groups. I do not deplore that. Even where rulemaking is a zero-
sum game among different interests, agencies are properly sensitive
to minimizing the losses to any particular group as a consequence
of the rule being adopted. Bargaining is not objectionable except
where it is done without rules, which would allow the decision to
be unfairly skewed by irrelevant factors such as who was able to
contact whom, ivhen, and so forth. On the other hand, why do we
have a structured rulemaking process with notice and comment
and, in the Home Box Office case, even oral argument? Is this just
a warmup for negotiations? I think not. It would seem to be an
attempt to require rulemakers to do more than rubberstamp agree-
ments by the affected parties. Instead, they must independently
assure themselves, from the evidence produced by these proce-
dures, that the rule is in fact in the public interest. That determi-
nation could be rendered illusory by unregulated ex parte contacts
creating a predisposition in the rulemaker's mind.
Moreover, I think it is somewhat naive to suppose that it is
necessary for an agency rulemaker to have informal discussions
with particular parties in order to gain an adequate understanding
of their "bottom line." For example, I think your FCC commis-
sioner in Home Box Office would, from the outset, have a pretty
"6 An even better example of this point than the pay-TV proceeding is the FCC's 1972
cable television rulemaking that explicitly incorporated a "consensus agreement" among the
principal industries concerned. Cable Television Report of Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972),
afl'd, 523 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975). See Besen, The Economics of the Cable Television
"Consensus," 17 J.L. & Econ. 39 (1974).
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good sense of what was soft and what was firm in the positions of
the parties as a result of his familiarity with the industry. If he did
not, I doubt he would obtain it from ex parte discussions. The par-
ties would be just as likely to seize such an opportunity to impress
him with the fervor of their opinions and the rational basis thereof
in hopes of securing a completely favorable decision, as they would
be to reveal which of their claims they would be willing to concede
without any quid pro quo.
Regarding your point about agencies being overloaded with in-
formation, your cure is puzzling: ex parte contacts will only add to
the overload. Also, your Home Box Office illustration seems an odd
one. The effect of pay TV is exactly the kind of factual information
the agency staff should have on hand or be able to research from
comments already submitted. The example confirms my suspicion
that part of the agency pressure against ex parte limitations may
be explained by the usual desire to follow the path of least resis-
tance. It is simply easier for an agency to ask the parties than to
investigate an issue itself. That does not mean it is impossible for
the agency to do the latter. In other words, I am not persuaded
that a ban on ex parte contacts would cause any reduction in the
amount of information available in usable form to the commission-
ers. The ban would merely have the beneficial effect of providing
an increased incentive for rulemaking participants and agency
staffs to supply all the necessary information in a comprehensible
form in the first instance. But there is another, even more serious,
problem with your analysis. Suppose that the information given
the commissioner is grossly erroneous. Or, to be more charitable,
suppose that it is skewed in such a manner as to favor the interests
of the party providing the information. If the information is pro-
vided by ex parte contacts, opposing parties will never even be
aware of, let alone have a chance to correct, the distortion. As a
result, if I were a broadcaster opposed to relaxing the pay-TV
rules, I would not be comfortable with your seeking important in-
formation from potential beneficiaries of the change such as the
Motion Picture Association without my being notified and given a
chance to respond.
Publius
I will not prolong our discussion of models of the rulemaking
process by an extended examination of the theoretical objections
to your analysis. I merely point out that you have to answer a
number of questions, such as the degree to which the "public inter-
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est" is the product of "private interest" arbitration. I would, how-
ever, like to pursue some of the practical problems associated with
your model of rulemaking.
I think you have not appreciated the practical limits to enforc-
ing decision-making "integrity" in the administrative process.
Take the kid-vid proceeding. Can you prevent Chairman Pert-
schuk from reading books on dental hygiene and nutrition to in-
form himself about the effects of sugared products on children, or
from reading Piaget and other developmental psychologists to
learn about children's perceptions and their ability to evaluate ad-
vertising messages? Probably not;1 57 yet such self-education would
seem open to precisely the same objections you raise against ex
parte contacts.
Brutus
There are always enforcement problems. Let's not confuse
these practical questions concerning compliance with the necessary
normative judgments about what is proper. As I said earlier, it is
important to establish normative criteria for due process even if
their enforcement depends largely on self-discipline. After all, for
the most part we already rely on that in the realms of both judicial
and legislative behavior in regard to such matters as bias and pecu-
niary interest. Even the bias and conflict-of-interest provisions
most clearly spelled out by statute or agency rules normally are
enforced only by voluntary recusal. As you noted earlier, disqualifi-
cation for bias is unusual even in adjudication. Besides, although
we may be unable to eliminate all extrarecord influ-
ences-Pertschuk's perusal of Piaget, for example-we can and
should eliminate those extrarecord influences that are most obnox-
ious because most distorted: those that involve communications
with interested parties. With regard to the unavoidable extrarecord
157 In addition to the practical impossibility of censoring a decision maker's reading, it
seems to be firmly established that such efforts to acquire some modest degree of personal
expertise on relevant issues is permissible. See 2 DAVIs TREATISE, supra note 29, § 15.03,
which gives numerous examples of courts and agencies drawing on "legislative facts" outside
the record of a particular case. A noteworthy recent example is Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), where, it is reported, Justice Blackmun spent two weeks in the library of the Mayo
Clinic doing medical research on abortion for his opinion in the case. B. WOODWARD & S.
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 229 (1979). Whether Justice Blackmun's extrajudicial investiga-
tion was appropriate depends perhaps on one's views of the Court's "legislative" role in the
case. Compare Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920 (1973) with Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Forward: Toward a Model of Roles
in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. Rzv. 1 (1973).
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influences, we may be concerned if Pertschuk's judgment about a
particular case is shaped by his study of untested sources outside
the record. But we can expect that most such generally available
sources will be neutral with respect to the particular issues, both
factual and legal, involved in the case. Moreover, these sources are
not secret. The primary vice of ex parte contacts is the secrecy of
the communication, which prevents any possibility of exposing fac-
tual errors or flaws in arguments.
Publius
Why do you assume that these outside sources will be neutral?
Suppose AT&T hires a leading economist to present testimony in a
rate case in support of the use of a particular economic theory to
evaluate the reasonableness of certain rates.158 Under Home Box
Office, the FCC commissioner cannot consult him off the record
about his testimony, but if the economist has also written a book
or an article on the same issue and reached the same conclusion,159
may the commissioner not read that?
Brutus
We are back to the point about enforcement. In addition, the
same scenario could occur in adjudication. Because I take it that
you are not advocating a change in the present ban on ex parte
contacts in adjudication, your last argument must not be a very
persuasive reason not to adopt such a ban in rulemaking.
Publius
I can suggest that the practical problems of enforcement of a
ban on ex parte contacts in rulemaking will be more difficult than
in adjudication because, one, there is less of a moral consensus
about the impropriety of ex parte contacts in the former process
58 See, e.g., AT&T (Telpak Tariff), 61 F.C.C.2d 587, 612, 631 (1976) (testimony of Pro-
fessor William Baumol in support of incremental cost standard for judging reasonableness
of AT&T rates), on reconsideration, 64 F.C.C.2d 971 (1977); 67 F.C.C.2d 1441 (1978), aflfd
in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC, Nos. 77-
1333 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 5, 1980), petitions for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3620 (U.S. Feb. 9, 1981)
(No. 80-1343), 49 U.S.L.W. 3664 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1981) (No. 80-1408).
15 See Baumol & Walton, Full Costing, Competition and Regulatory Practice, 82 YALE
L.J. 639 (1973) (incremental cost and fully distributed costs as standards for judging public
utility rates). See also Baumol, On the Proper Cost Tests for Natural Monopoly in a Mul-
tiproduct Industry, 67 AM. EcoN. REv. 809 (1977); Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Re-
ductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YA.E L.J. 1 (1979).
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and, two, it provides a greater opportunity to cheat. With regard to
my first contention, the fact that ex parte contacts have been so
long accepted, and are still consciously defended, is sufficient
proof. As to the second, I note simply that any agency that wants
to avoid the rule can easily do so by conducting all of its basic fact-
finding process before a notice of rulemaking is issued. It is, of
course, impossible for a communication to constitute an ex parte
contact before there are any proceedings or parties. This approach
is not merely a theoretical possibility. The FCC, for example, has
quite often conducted preliminary "inquiries" prior to informal
rulemaking.160 Although this practice was common before Home
Box Office, I predict that it will become the norm in the future. As
a result, the "rulemaking" proceedings and their ban on ex parte
contacts will become largely a formality.161
You could, of course, extend the ex parte ban to such "inquir-
ies." But where do you stop? You cannot put the agency in a her-
metically sealed container permanently insulated from all contacts.
Yet that seems to be precisely what proponents of the "new due
process" seek-witness the recent effort to apply the new rules to
preclude ex parte communications between an executive agency
and the White House. 162 If the new due process rule persists for
private ex parte contacts, we can expect to see it also being applied
to block effective presidential, and perhaps even congressional, in-
fluence over the federal bureaucracy.163
10 See, e.g., Inquiry into Economic Relationship between Television Broadcasting &
Cable Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632 (1979). Sometimes an "inquiry" is combined with
rulemaking. See, e.g., Second Computer Inquiry, 72 F.C.C.2d 358 (1979). What advantage
the agency derives from tacking the label "inquiry" onto a rulemaking proceeding is not
clear. Indeed, before Home Box Office the agency may not have attached any procedural
importance to the distinction between an inquiry and an informal rulemaking. Presumably
the only distinction was that a mere "inquiry" signaled to the public that the agency was
not prepared to formulate even tentative rules. Since Home Box Office, however, the distinc-
tion between the two types of proceedings takes on substantial importance.
1"1 There is a hint of this evolutionary process in the recent FCC rulemaking proceed-
ings on deregulation of cable television, which followed "inquiries" that thoroughly explored
the issues, obtained public comment, and developed "tentative" decisions. See Cable Televi-
sion Syndicated Exclusivity Rules, 71 F.C.C.2d 951 (1979); Inquiry into Economic Relation-
ship Between Television Broadcasting & Cable Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632 (1979).
"' See Verkuil, supra note 20, at 945-47.
See Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A
Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1369, 1433-37 (1977); Bruff, Presidential
Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451, 500-06 (1979). Of course, if Chief
Judge Wright's gloss of Home Box Office in United Steelworkers is accepted, the ex parte
ban would be limited to parties with a financial stake in the outcome; in that case the rule
presumably would be inapplicable to contacts by the legislature or the executive.
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Brutus
This parade of horribles only confuses the central question
and causes us to lose sight of the issue before us. The controversies
over presidential and congressional control of the bureaucracy
transcend the Home Box Office issue."" For example, the debate
over White House intervention in executive agency rulemaking6 5
'is only partly related to-the issue of ex parte contacts; it also in-
volves what some perceive to be White House interference with
objectives mandated by Congress.1 66 Quite apart from the form
that White House intervention takes-whether it is on or off the
record-it is important that such intervention be faithful to the
laws Congress has passed.
I mention this point not to suggest that we pursue it, but
rather to put the due process issue in political perspective. It is, I
think, naive to suppose that the controversy over presidential con-
trol and influence derives from Home Box Office or any other judi-
cial precedent. It really arises out of the general political contro-
versy over openness in government and control of our growing
bureaucracy. These problems have been with us for several dec-
ades, and have prompted endless regulatory reform and govern-
ment reorganization.16 7 They have evoked more intense and con-
troversial concern in recent years for a number of reasons, both
political and economic-for example, celebrated abuses of power;
the adverse impact of government programs on the economy;
greater public awareness of and unhappiness with the magnitude
of government intervention in the economy and society; and politi-
cal competition between the President and Congress for control of
the bureaucracy.
Publius
If we cannot pursue all of these political factors, can we never-
'" For recent reviews of the executive and congressional roles in rulemaking, and the
various legal issues raised, see authorities cited note 163 supra.
165 See generally Verkuil, supra note 20; see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMIS-
SION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM 68-91 (1979) [here-
inafter cited as ABA COMMISSION REPORT]. The concern caused by presidential intervention
in regulatory affairs is scarcely a new one. See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 147-62.
108 ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 165, at 78.
1M7 Recent reform measures are summarized and reviewed in G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN
& H. BRUFF, supra note 98, at 801-83. Major effects prior to 1970 are noted in Robinson, On
Reorganizing the Independent Regulatory Agencies, 57 VA. L. REv. 947 (1971). See also
ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 165, at 13-23.
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theless discuss the role of law in all this? I agree that the present
controversies over White House"6 8 influence on agency rulemaking
go well beyond the question of rulemaking due process. But the
due process question is in a sense the focal point on which much of
the general controversy is now converging. Unfortunately, the
rather narrow focus of the legal procedure question may well ob-
scure the larger substantive issues, both political and legal, at
stake. You did not respond to my point that the strict due process
logic of the Home Box Office rule threatens a drastic and unwise
restriction on the prerogative of the White House. Indeed, it
threatens the prerogative of Congress as well. If the President is
forbidden to communicate ex parte with the administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency over proposed environmental
regulations, such contacts by senators or the Senate Committee on
Government Operations would presumably be forbidden as well.169
We are left with the following remarkable state of affairs: the Pres-
ident of the United States cannot tell his own executive depart-
ments what to do in carrying out his executive prerogatives, and
Congress cannot give those departments its sense of its legislative
mandate. You might conceivably explain barring White House in-
tervention in independent regulatory agency rulemaking by the
theory that agency policies are not subject to direct White House
control. 170 In the case of congressional intervention, you could ar-
18 The term "White House" is used to include both the President and his immediate
advisors, who necessarily act as his surrogates in most interventions. See H. FRIENDLY, supra
note 6, at 153-54. Most, but not all, of the current controversies involve intervention by
White House aides. See ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 165, at 74-78. On earlier in-
terventions, see W. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 5-26 (1967).
16' Thus, in Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966), the court forbade con-
gressional intrusion in an agency adjudication. The intrusion consisted of interrogation of
agency members in open public hearings. In D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d
1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972), the court invalidated a decision by
the Secretary of Transportation approving construction of a bridge across the Potomac
River, because it was made under congressional pressure. The pressure consisted of threats
by the head of a House appropriations committee to delay appropriations for Washington's
subway system until the Secretary approved the bridge construction. Although the case was
not strictly legislative in character (and the court indicated that the result might have been
different if it had been), neither was it in any way adjudicative.
Senator Dirksen would be appalled, and rightly so, that we had fallen to such a state.
As he remarked a generation ago: "I have been calling agencies for 25 years.... Are we to
be put on the carpet because we represent our constituents, make inquiries, and find out
what the status of matters is, and so serve our constituents?" 105 CONG. REc. 14057 (1959).
See also 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(2) (1976) (rules barring ex parte contacts in adjudication are not
authority to withhold information from Congress).
170 This is the inference quite commonly drawn from Humphrey's Ex'r v. United
1981]
The University of Chicago Law Review [48:201
gue that any attempt to control agency policy exceeds Congress's
prerogatives, 'which are limited to enacting laws, not overseeing
their administration.171 But the Home Box Office ex parte ban pre-
sumably would forbid the President even to talk to his own Secre-
tary of Labor about health standards regulations. 17 2 This seems to
me to be an absurd-and possibly unconstitutional 17 -restriction.
Brutus
Again, you confuse the due process issue with the broader po-
litical question. Whatever may be permissible limits on the presi-
dential power to direct independent agency policy or on the con-
gressional power to oversee administration of the laws, what we are
discussing here does not involve them. No one argues that the
White House or Congress cannot seek to influence agency rules by
communicating their views. They have at least as much right to do
so as any private person. The relevant question is rather how such
communications shall be made. On this view of the issue, we do
States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (removal of FTC commissioner). The qualifying word "direct"
denotes that certain specific presidential prerogatives such as the appointments power and
budgetary review can be used to influence policy. See Bruff, supra note 163, at 491-99. Be-
yond these kinds of controls, it is unclear how much legal authority the President has to
direct (as distinct from political power to influence) the actions of independent agencies.
Compare id. at 499 (authority to issue procedural directives) with Robinson, supra note 37,
at 207-08, 208 n.89 (no basis for distinguishing between procedural and substantive direc-
tives under President's article II powers.) See generally P. Strauss, Presidential Authority
over Regulatory Decisions (Oct. 23, 1980) (on file with The University of Chicago Law
Review).
1 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121-22, 139-41 (1976) (per curiam); Watson, Con-
gress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 983,
1042-43 (1975). See also D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972); Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966).
172 Cf. Demuth, The White House Review Program, REGULATION, Jan.-Feb. 1980, at 13,
19 (possible impropriety of President Carter's involvement in cotton dust case).
173 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926):
The vesting of the executive power in the President was essentially a grant of the
power to execute the laws .... He must execute them by the assistance of subordi-
nates .... As he is charged specifically to take care that they be faithfully executed,
the reasonable implication. . . was that as part of his executive power he should select
those who were to act for him under his discretion in the execution of the laws.
The context for this statement was the question whether Congress could deprive the Presi-
dent of the power to remove an officer of the executive branch. The power of selection and
removal does not necessarily imply a power of unfettered discretion in direction, or indeed
vice versa. See P. Strauss, supra note 170. It is, however, a fair inference from the Court's
reasoning that at least the prerogative of selection and removal implies a coextensive pre-
rogative of direction.
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not need to become enmeshed in a consideration of separation of
powers or constitutional prerogatives.
All that is being claimed is that once a rulemaking process is
underway, any communications intended to influence that pro-
ceeding174 must be made publicly, on the record, and with notice to
other parties.17 5 Just as in the case of the ban on private ex parte
contacts, this merely expands on a principle already applied in
nonrulemaking cases.17 6
Publius
So you have now come full circle and returned to the earlier
argument about whether adjudicatory due process is appropriately
applied to rulemaking in general. I would rather raise a new ques-
tion: whether executive or legislative intervention presents a spe-
cial case where ex parte contacts should be permitted, regardless of
the general rule. As I suggested earlier, the logic of Home Box Of-
fice seems clearly to extend to all extrarecord influences, whether
the source is a private party or an official body. In either situation,
the integrity of the process is compromised. Yet it seems unrealis-
tic to treat the President or Congress as just another party in these
cases. Each has special constitutional prerogatives to defend. It is
true that these prerogatives are not absolute; in the case of adjudi-
cation, they are limited by the competing constitutional norms of
due process.17 But I am not aware of any comparable constitu-
174 Under the Home Box Office formulation, any communications "'relating to the dis-
position'" of the proceeding are banned. 567 F.2d at 57 n.126 (quoting Exec. Order No.
11,920, 3 C.F.R. 121 (1976 Compilation)). The court did not consider the problem of general
discussions of policy matters that may inadvertently touch on a pending rulemaking. Before
Home Box Office, this problem was resolved by requiring intent to influence. See note 41
supra. Such a standard seems consistent with Home Box Office. There, the court conceded
the need to maintain a general flow of information to the agency. Without this exception, it
would be difficult or impossible to keep any informal information channels open. That is to
say, if everyone with an interest in any pending rulemaking who discussed policy issues with
the agency were subject to a strict liability standard with regard to the ex parte rules, virtu-
ally no contacts would be allowed.
"7 The recent report of the ABA Commission on Law and the Economy recommends
that the President be given the power to direct agencies to consider, reconsider, modify, or
reverse rulemaking actions, but specifies that such power be exercised in accordance with
"applicable statutes or regulations governing the affected agency as to ex parte contacts."
ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 165, at 81.
171 See, e.g., D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972); Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966).
17 Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707-13 (1974) (general privilege of confi-
dentiality of presidential communications superseded by due process requirements of crimi-
nal justice system).
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tional requirements for rulemaking. On what basis, then, do the
courts presume to limit the constitutional prerogatives of the Pres-
ident and Congress by forbidding them to exercise ex parte influ-
ence in agency rulemaking?
Brutus
I fail to see how any constitutional prerogative of Congress is
involved. As you noted previously, Congress's power to enact laws
does not imply any corresponding power to shape executive imple-
mentation of those laws. To repeat my earlier points, Congress
may, and it certainly does, seek to influence agency policy-a "pre-
rogative" shared with all members of the public. But I know of no
special congressional constitutional prerogative in this area.
In the case of the President, a constitutional prerogative to
influence agency action is more easily discerned, at least so far as
the executive branch agencies are concerned. In fact, one of the
core presidential prerogatives is the power to give general direc-
tions to officials in the executive branch on how to administer the
laws and implement public policies. But even this prerogative is
bounded. Suppose, for example, the President directs the adminis-
trator of the EPA to include a cost-benefit analysis in his review of
state plans implementing air quality standards. Such a directive
would be contrary to the Clean Air Act,178 and the President's pos-
session of constitutional prerogatives regarding enforcement does
not give him the authority to override Congress's directions. The
same is true of purely procedural matters: I take it the President
cannot direct his Secretary of the Interior to disregard the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act and not provide public notice of and op-
portunity to comment on strip mining regulations. Can he never-
theless render the APA rulemaking process a sham by an ex parte
contact directing the Secretary to disregard any comments re-
ceived in opposition to the regulations as proposed?179
Publius
To be sure, the President would exceed his authority by giving
such an instruction. But I think you are trying to cover up a faulty
178 See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256-66 (1976) (EPA may not reject state
pollution plan on grounds of economic infeasibility).
179 See discussion of the controversy over the strip mining rules and the ex parte con-
tacts by White House staff in ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 165, at 75-76.
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premise with a flawless, but irrelevant, logical deduction. In your
hypothetical, the President's action is impermissible because it is
an attempt to override a valid congressional directive, not because
it was an ex parte contact. The fact is that Congress has not pro-
scribed ex parte contacts in informal rulemaking. Such contacts
therefore are not forbidden. Admittedly, Congress just recently im-
posed some restrictions on ex parte contacts in FTC rulemaking.
But these were explicitly recognized as special regulations justi-
fied by the previous judicialization of FTC rulemaking.180 That
these special regulations were seen as necessary is a clear indica-
tion that Congress itself does not believe it has precluded ex parte
contacts. 181
Brutus
You had originally implied that the President had certain con-
stitutional prerogatives to influence his executive officers, and I
merely wanted to show that these prerogatives are not absolute,
ISO The Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252,
§ 12, 94 Stat. 374 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 57a), essentially codifies a previous FTC practice
rule requiring that all ex parte communications be made a part of the rulemaking record.
(In the case of oral communications, a verbatim transcript was required.) See 16 C.F.R.
§ 1.18 (1980). To these agency requirements, Congress has added a requirement of advance
public notice. Although the imposition of a notice and verbatim record requirement radi-
cally transforms the character of what ex parte contacts have typically been understood to
be, it is noteworthy that, contrary to Home Box Office, Congress is explicit in permitting ex
parte contacts that conform to these requirements. See also S. REP. No. 500, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 22-23 (1979), reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 2268, 2289-90. It is
especially significant that these notice and record restrictions on contacts were seen as spe-
cial to the FTC. Explaining the Senate bill's ex parte contacts provision-which was
adopted by the conference committee, see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 917, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 32,
reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 2309, 2315-the Senate Report states:
By recommending adoption of special requirements for disclosure of ex parte commu-
nications between the rulemaking staff and the Commission in Magnuson-Moss
rulemakings, the Committee does not endorse any general departure from the long-
established requirements in rulemaking proceedings of other agencies. The Committee
acknowledges the concern that, in other agency rulemaking proceedings, such require-
ments could unduly rigidify the decision process and unduly hamper internal commu-
nication, but the Committee recommends the application of disclosure requirements
here because it feels that such requirements will not unduly hamper or rigidify
Magnuson-Moss rulemakings.
S. REP. No. 500, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 n.7 (1979), reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2268, 2290 n.7.
'S This inference draws further support from the fact that Senator Kennedy thought it
was necessary to introduce a bill, S. 1291, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), that would have
amended section 533 of the APA to extend restrictions on ex parte contacts to informal
rulemaking.
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but rather are subject to both substantive and procedural con-
straints as enacted by Congress or declared by the courts. You are
correct in stating that Congress has not banned ex parte contacts
in informal rulemaking; indeed one might even argue that it has
implicitly approved them inasmuch as it recently adopted such a
ban for on-the-record proceedings only.18 2 But Congress, like the
rest of government, does not always appreciate the full legal force
of its actions until the courts uncover the "inner logic." That is
essentially what Home Box Office does. The ex parte ban is admit-
tedly a judicial innovation, perhaps a fairly radical one, but it is
ultimately derived from the legislative mandate of the APA requir-
ing meaningful procedures and effective judicial review of agency
action.
Publius
Your resort to the phrase "ultimately derived" is a bit like
Justice Douglas's perception of a right of privacy in the "penum-
bras, formed by emanations" from the Constitution. 83 Unfortu-
nately, some of us have difficulty in seeing these emanations. We
are thus put in a position of anxious dependence on those fortu-
nate enough to possess such vision.
Perhaps the emanations will be made more visible by future
congressional action. But I doubt that Congress will endorse a flat
ban on ex parte contacts in agency rulemaking. Significantly, it did
not purport to do so in its recent FTC Act amendments. Congress
certainly will not ban ex parte contacts to the extent of forbidding
its own free-wheeling efforts to influence agency rules. Such a
move would run contrary to the obvious motive for enacting legis-
lative veto provisions-which is to provide congressional commit-
tees and staff the leverage to influence agency rules before they are
adopted.""
In any event, whether or not Congress endorses the Home Box
Office rule, I see nothing but mischief coming from its general pro-
hibition on all ex parte communications. I am not against formal-
ized process in administrative regulation. I can even regard the de-
velopment of hybrid-rulemaking requirements as benign. But
182 Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-909, § 4(a), 90 Stat. 1246 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 557(d) (1976)); see H.R. REP. No. 880, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2183, 2201.
18 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
18 See Bruff & Gehllorn, supra note 163, at 1409-12.
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wholesale judicialization of rulemaking threatens to defeat the
most desirable feature of the rulemaking process-its flexibility for
obtaining information and opinion.
Brutus
Throughout our discussion the emphasis has been on prohibit-
ing communications. Your latest objection might be remedied by
emphasizing the ex parte aspect. It ought to be possible to permit
informal contacts and exchanges of views but still to maintain a
public record that would serve to notify other parties at least with
regard to the occurrence and general subject matter of such
contacts.1 8
5
Publius
That does seem like an appealing compromise. I am discon-
certed, however, by the thought that such a solution, like other re-
cent record disclosure requirements,18 will introduce even more
complexity into administrative procedure. Is this the price of ra-
tional process, or an unnecessary encumbrance with little gain at
high cost? I foresee the end result as being the creation of yet an-
other mountain of official records, infested with an army of re-
searchers wanting to know who talked to whom about what. No
doubt the seekers of truth will not be content merely to look; they
will want to challenge the accuracy or completeness of the records
being disclosed.187 More rules will be necessary, along with more
bureaucrats to administer them.1 88 Needless to say, the courts will
185 The FCC, for example, has recently adopted rules requiring a record of outside con-
tacts with decision makers during the pendency of all rulemaking proceedings to be kept
and periodically published. See Ex Parte Presentations, 47 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1213,
1222-25 (F.C.C. June 30, 1980). The requirements imposed on FTC rulemaking by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980 go further in requiring both a record and
notice in advance of the contacts. See note 180 supra. See also ABA COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 165, at 81 (proposal for logging ex parte contacts with President and staff); Note,
supra note 2, at 209-11 (proposing a public record for ex parte contacts, in addition to other
restrictions: showing of good cause and limitation of contacts to period after the time for
public comment is closed).
, The most notable example is 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
IS? Such is the lesson to be learned from the extensive Freedom of Information Act
litigation over the completeness of the records disclosed by the agency and agency claims of
exemption. See generally Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73
MIcH. L. REv. 971, 1022-1163 (1975); Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven Year
Assessment, 74 COLUM. L. Rav. 895 (1974).
I" It is not known how many public employees are required to handle current FOIA
requests.'One report recently noted: "In 1978, 51,345 freedom of information requests were
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have to be included in the game, to take a "hard look" for them-
selves at the records and record-keeping requirements in order to
ensure full openness. 89 The courts will almost surely want more
rules-and rulemaking.
Brutus
Subject to due process, I hope.
Publius
Of course. It will be as Grant Gilmore has predicted: "In Hell
there will be nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously
observed."' 90
IV. POSTSCRIPT
Our dialogue is not merely inconclusive, it is incomplete, and
not a little impressionistic in approaching the problems of
rulemaking due process. Nevertheless, we were loath to try to im-
pose greater order, certainty, or finality on this subject than we
have found in the altogether modest jurisprudence that has so far
developed. The most we can offer are a few closing observations
about how the law and public attitudes are developing, where they
may take us in the future, and what the implications are for the
administrative process.
We began by pointing out the changing focus of the legal is-
sues surrounding rulemaking-from questions of power to ques-
filed at the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 56,466 at the Department of
Defense (costing $6 million to process), and 1,732 ... at the FTC." Lemann, Freedom of
Information Act: More Helpful to Lawyers, Washington Post, June 7, 1980, § A, at 3, col. 1.
See also Open Am. v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 613 n.14 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (FOIA requests occupied 191 full-time FBI employees in 1976); Weaver, U.S.
Information Act: Difficulties Despite Successes, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1977, at 1, col. 4. Some
administrative law scholars have gone so far, in fact, as to call FOIA litigation and scholar-
ship "one of the major growth areas of administration [sic] law." W. GELLHORN, C. BYsE &
P. STRAuss, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW 580 n.4 (7th ed. 1979). This is not to say that the costs of
public disclosure necessarily outweigh the benefits, but they ought not to be incurred except
for substantial reasons.
,89 Cf. Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1191-95 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (scope of judicial review
and procedures to be observed by agencies with respect to FOIA exemptions). The extent of
judicial involvement can be seen in the recent Supreme Court interest in the subject. See,
e.g., GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union, 445 U.S. 375 (1980); Forsham v. Harris, 445
U.S. 169 (1980); Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136
(1980).
190 G. GILMORE, THE AGES oF AMERICAN LAW Ill (1977).
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tions of process. That change is in part the predictable result of a
maturing jurisprudence: questions of power are logically antece-
dent to questions of the process by which it is to be exercised. But
the new focus on process has also unearthed some fundamental
concerns about the uses of rulemaking that perhaps ought to have
been-but were not-considered in the first instance when ques-
tions of power were foremost. At one time, the courts were so en-
thusiastic about the virtues of rulemaking as a tool for making pol-
icy that they virtually commanded its use in place of
adjudication." 1 Ironically, the courts now appear to be attempting
to engraft adjudicatory formalities onto rulemaking.192 If, as Emer-
son said, "a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds," 93
perhaps our minds are simply too small to detect the core of sense
in this apparent inconsistency in attitude. It may be that what we
see as inconsistency is merely the working out of a kind of rough
Hegelian dialectic: the thesis of rulemaking virtues and antithesis
of rulemaking vices may be resolving themselves into a new
synthesis.
Just what that synthesis will be is unclear. One reason is that
we have not yet developed any clear or enduring conception of how
great a legislative role agencies should play in rulemaking. When
the early law affirmed that agencies could and should use rulemak-
ing to develop agency policy, it was largely in the limited context
of deciding whether particular issues could be determined in
rulemaking rather than adjudication.' Little attention was paid
to the fact that the use for rulemaking as a tool inevitably implied
a wider scope of legislative power to agencies than before. Broad
legislative delegations of power to agencies were, of course, ap-
proved before the courts ever looked at the question of rulemaking
as a means of exercising that power.195 Even a very broad delega-
tion of power to an agency may have little significance, however, if
it can be exercised only through costly and time-consuming adjudi-
191 See, e.g., Bell Aerospace Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 495-97 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd,
416 U.S. 267, 290-95 (1974).
1'2 See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973). But see Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
193 R. EMERSON, ESSAYS: FIRST SERIS 58 (1890).
194 SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 11), 332 U.S. 194 (1947); American Airlines, Inc. v.
CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
19 Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245
(1947); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
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catory processes. In that case, the agency's positions develop into
legal values only through the slow evolution of case precedent.
Such processes give far less rein to the exercise of delegated power
than does the ability to promulgate general rules that are immedi-
ately binding and readily enforceable against all within the juris-
dictional reach of the agency.
At the very least, the appearance of basic agency power has
been enhanced as a consequence of recognizing rulemaking
processes. For example, the FTC's power to remedy "unfairness"
in the marketplace never received as much attention when it was
used to shore up adjudicatory complaints against individual adver-
tisements 96 as when it was used to challenge by rule a class of
advertising by an entire industry.197 The greater immediate reach
of the rule made the agency appear much more threatening, even
though it could have achieved the same result by a series of adjudi-
cations. Given the growing popular disenchantment with the per-
vasive bureaucratization of economic and social life, it seems inevi-
table that this apparent evidence of increased bureaucratic power
in the form of rulemaking would prompt attempts to limit that
power. 98
Limitations have appeared, or have been proposed, in different
forms. One type is expressed by changes in the legislative charter,
the most dramatic of which are exemplified by current trends in
industry deregulation and other legislative alterations in the scope
of agency mandates. 199 Less dramatic in effect but far more com-
See, e.g., Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976).
19 See Children's Advertising, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,967 (F.T.C. 1978), suspended by the
Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374,
discussed in note 180 supra.
1" Also contributing to this increased attention was the decision of the Supreme Court
in 1967 that agency rules are subject to preenforcement review. Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). Although designed to protect regulated persons from the cost
of compliance with a rule ultimately reversed, preenforcement review can also have the ef-
fect of precluding later challenges to the validity of a rule in a subsequent enforcement
proceeding. See, e.g., Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 592 n.9 (1980). This denial
of an effective opportunity for review-not a new phenomenon in the enforcement of agency
policy or rules, see G. ROBINSON & E. GELLHORN, THE ADMINISTRATIV PROCESS 84
(1974)-also seems a possible basis for the felt dissatisfaction with the rulemaking process.
Cf. J. THBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUsTIncE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975) (im-
portance of participation to perceptions of justice); Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type
Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 VA. L. REv. 585, 591-93 (1972) (same); Walker,
Lind & Thibaut, The Relation Between Procedural and Distributive Justice, 65 VA. L.
REv. 1401, 1416-17 (1979) (same).
19 E.g., Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified at
49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1729 (Supp. III 1979)); Clean Air Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95,
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mon is the legislative veto of agency rules200 -a concept that has
recently been incorporated into proposals for a presidential veto.201
Against the background of these developments, the creation of
procedural constraints on agency rulemaking takes on a slightly
different coloration than we gave it in our dialogue. These proce-
dural limits appear to be less an outgrowth of traditional due pro-
cess concerns of fairness and accuracy in the application of law202
than a negative reaction to the independent use of legislative
power by agencies.
For just this reason one should expect the future of these
kinds of limits to be tied directly to the larger trends. Despite the
dissatisfaction with the Home Box Office ex parte rule, for exam-
ple, one should not be surprised to see some such restriction incor-
porated into general legislation.03 It is even possible to foresee the
ultimate adoption of a bias standard for rulemakers similar to that
rejected in National Advertisers. More generally, it is foreseeable
that hybrid rulemaking will increase, not diminish, Vermont Yan-
kee notwithstanding.
We do not offer this forecast to suggest approval. On that
score our dialogue is still unfinished. In large measure one's view
depends on how one looks at the exercise of rulemaking power. We
do think it likely that present trends, if continued, will cause some
shift from rulemaking back to adjudication. The adjudicatory
methods may not, as we noted, offer the same advantages to the
agency as rulemaking in terms of establishing a broad range of eas-
ly enforceable legal power. But as open power becomes vulnerable
to attack, it may be to an agency's advantage to employ less visible
91 Stat. 685-796 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (Supp. II 1978)) (112 pages of statutory
specification).
20 See generally Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 163; McGowan, Congress, Court and
Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1119 (1975).
201 See generally Bruff, supra note 163; Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political
Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395 (1975).
201 This is the traditional due process case. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976).
203 An early forerunner is contained in the recent amendment to the Federal Trade
Commission Act. See note 180 supra. At bottom, the issue of what if any limitations to
impose on rulemakers in connection with evidence of bias or ex parte contacts, is a question
of how our government should be structured and policy formulated-who should be allowed
to participate and when. In regard to informal rulemaking, section 553 of the APA provides
no guidance, for the current role of rulemaking in making policy was not anticipated by its
framers. Nor does it seem appropriate for courts to supply a post hoc rule and rationaliza-
tion for such a basic issue of governance.
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methods of applying its delegated power.20 4
We do not profess to see the longer term implications of this
new "synthesis." Logically it should follow that substantial con-
straints on the rulemaking process could diminish the scope of
practicably enforceable agency power. One might even foresee that
agencies will retreat to a more modest role of "filling in" legislative
gaps, or serving as real, not merely fictional, arms of Congress.2 0 5
But this is heady speculation, and we are reluctant to indulge it on
the basis of this dialogue.
204 See Note, NLRB Rulemaking: Political Reality Versus Procedural Fairness, 89
YALE L.J. 982, 993-98 (1980) (contending that use of adjudication rather than rulemaking to
achieve policy objectives renders those objectives less conspicuous and thus minimizes con-
flict with Congress).
20I For a very interesting analysis along these lines, see Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond
the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 YAm L.J. 1466 (1980).
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